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ABSTRACT 
Development and Evaluation of a Fault Detection and Identification Scheme for the WVU YF-22 
UAV Using the Artificial Immune System Approach 
 
Sebastian P. Sanchez 
 
A failure detection and identification (FDI) scheme is developed for a small remotely controlled 
jet aircraft based on the Artificial Immune System (AIS) paradigm. Pilot-in-the-loop flight data are used 
to develop and test a scheme capable of identifying known and unknown aircraft actuator and sensor 
failures. Negative selection is used as the main mechanism for self/non-self definition; however, an 
alternative approach using positive selection to enhance performance is also presented. Tested failures 
include aileron and stabilator locked at trim and angular rate sensor bias. Hyper-spheres are chosen to 
represent detectors. Different definitions of distance for the matching rules are applied and their effect on 
the behavior of hyper-bodies is discussed. All the steps involved in the creation of the scheme are 
presented including design selections embedded in the different algorithms applied to generate the 
detectors set. The evaluation of the scheme is performed in terms of detection rate, false alarms, and 
detection time for normal conditions and upset conditions. The proposed detection scheme achieves good 
detection performance for all flight conditions considered. This approach proves promising potential to 
cope with the multidimensional characteristics of integrated/comprehensive detection for aircraft sub-
system failures. 
A preliminary performance comparison between an AIS based FDI scheme and a Neural Network 
and Floating Threshold based one is presented including groundwork on assessing possible improvements 
on pilot situational awareness aided by FDI schemes. Initial results favor the AIS approach to FDI due to 
its rather undemanding adaptation capabilities to new environments. The presence of the FDI scheme 
suggests benefits for the interaction between the pilot and the upset conditions by improving the accuracy 
of the identification of each particular failure and decreasing the detection delays. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
Flight safety has concerned mankind since the very first day a man-designed machine lifted off 
by its own means. The first formal attempts to make flying machines safer started in the mid 1920s when 
USA started regulating civil aviation via the Air Commerce Act of May 20, 1926. This effort was a first 
step in setting up standards that would diminish the chances of fatal accidents caused by unsafe designs 
and/or operations of air vehicles. This would lead to what is now known as the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) created in 1958 and to many other organizations working towards safer skies [1]. 
As expected, evolution of flying machines motivated an increase in the number and complexity of 
the constituent sub-systems. Even complying with all the present regulations, these subsystems are to 
certain extent susceptible to failures. Depending on how critical a particular subsystem is for flight safety, 
a single subsystem failure may result in very dangerous situations, frequently with disastrous outcomes. 
According to [2], more than 25% of fatal accidents from 1950 to the present day involved some type of 
mechanical failure. Several of these cases were attributed to failures causing surfaces to jam or move to 
extreme positions followed sometimes by worsening actions performed by the uninformed flight crew. 
Most of these incidents ended up in the worst way causing catastrophes involving not only people inside 
the plane but, occasionally, also people on ground. 
In some cases pilot skills, helped by particularities of the malfunction, allowed the flight to 
continue and land safely as was the case of an EMB-145, which in April 2001 experienced a jammed 
horizontal stabilizer in trim position during cruise flight. Fortunately, the pilot was able to perform a 
landing without incidents. Other flights, however, ended up the worst way like United Airlines 585 
(March 1991) and USAir 427 (September 1994) both involving Boeings 737 and rudder failures that 
caused the control surface to deflect in opposite direction to pilot inputs [3]. Could the pilots have 
recovered the aircraft if an onboard Failure Detection and Identification (FDI) system would have warned 
them of the nature of the failure? Could information from the first flight have been used to train the FDI 
scheme to improve detection or even accommodation in the event of such a failure? These and many 
other questions remain unanswered but the usefulness of comprehensive FDI systems as an aid to flight 
safety can hardly be argued. 
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1.1. Literature Review 
Failures, faults, upset conditions, abnormal conditions among others, are terms used in literature 
to refer to similar or equivalent situations in which some system experiences behavior that is not expected 
and/or desired. In this context, any real world system is susceptible of some type of failure and thus, 
preventing, detecting, correcting, and/or adapting to such situations has been the focus of many research 
efforts in the most varied fields. Nevertheless, areas of technology such as aerospace, where the 
occurrence of these undesirable situations represents a substantial increase in risks or costs, pioneered the 
research of tools to cope with the inevitable likelihood of facing failures. 
In the early days, physical redundancy of components was proposed to grant the failsafe concept 
by which if one component was to fail the redundant one/s would be equally capable of allowing the 
plane’s safe operation. This approach can be acceptable up to some extent for some subsystems; however, 
it poses many drawbacks that have made it highly impractical to deal with the evolving number and 
variety of subsystems present in an airplane. The first important consequence of physical redundancy is 
an increase in airplane’s weight which translates in a decrease of its payload, an increase in fuel 
consumption and so on. A second effect of physical redundancy is that it can hide the effects of some 
failures thus hindering the possibility of taking corrective action; this could lead to more catastrophic 
combinations of failures. 
Increasing the safety of aircraft operation has become in recent years a major objective for the 
aerospace engineering community and particularly for NASA’s Aviation Safety Program [4]. 
Considerable attention has been paid to failures for which the plane had the potential of continuing the 
flight safely if the correct actions would have been taken. Malfunctions that can be listed in this group are 
control surface failures and sensor failures. Research has pointed on technologies capable of providing at 
least the chance for a safe emergency landing even after some subsystems have stopped working. 
Part of the efforts to achieve this goal has been aimed to develop control systems capable of 
accommodation/adaptation during abnormal conditions. NASA Ames Research Center started a program 
called Intelligent Flight Control (IFC) in 1992 to “examine alternate sources of control power to 
accommodate in-flight control system failures” [5; 6]. The IFC program focused on development and 
evaluation of control systems capable of taking advantage of the remaining healthy subsystems in the 
event of a failure to allow an increase in survivability rates for various failures. IFC research made wide 
use of a variety of Neural Network architectures to create control systems capable of overcoming 
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mathematical errors in the modeling of the plant and at the same time robust enough to allow adaptation 
to new dynamic conditions of the plant produced by several factors [5]. 
Analytical techniques examined for IFC and in general for fault detection and/or accommodation 
can be divided in two large groups: 
• Model based approach 
• Knowledge based approach 
Both approaches have proven successful depending on the particular application. 
Model based techniques make use of an explicit mathematical model of the system. This model is 
used to obtain estimated behavior of the plant to the given inputs. The outputs of the model allow 
comparison with the actual outputs of the system and decisions can be taken upon evaluating the 
difference between the two (residual) [7]. Failures are said to have definite signatures that present as 
combinations of particular behavior of these residuals. Failure detection consists then in two stages, 
residuals generation and decision making. Different techniques can be used to generate these residuals 
from which the following is a partial list of the most common ones. 
• Observer-based approaches rely on the use of Kalman Filters or other types of filters to 
generate such residuals. Chen and Saif presented in [8] an implementation of Thau’s and 
sliding-mode observers for detecting actuator failures in the presence of superimposed 
nonlinearities. Wang et al. applied a similar approach in [9] for detecting (and 
accommodating) failures on a simulation of an aerospace vehicle. These classes of 
systems and particularly those relying in Kalman filters have been shown in [10] to 
experience problems when dealing with strong nonlinearities and uncertainties. The 
concept of multiple models, switching, and tuning appears as an extension to this 
approach and was successfully implemented to provide adaptive capabilities in the event 
of control surface blockage failures in [11] and also for sensor failures [12]; both 
references used airplane simulations to evaluate the strengths of the created schemes. 
• Parity relations approaches are based on analytical redundancy and can take two forms, 
direct redundancy when dealing with instantaneous sensors outputs, or, temporal 
redundancy when involving relationships among time histories of sensors and actuators 
[13]. Residuals are obtained from these comparisons as measures of the discrepancy 
between the reigning conditions and the expected behavior for normal conditions. This 
approach served in [14] to detect failures in a nonlinear model of generic servoactuator 
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used for manipulating robots; this work showed how the use of nonlinear parity equations 
avoids modeling errors and the need for linearization of nonlinear models. Kabbaj et al. 
presented in [15] an application of this technique to detect failures in greenhouse 
processes for both sensors and actuators failures and described the used of fixed threshold 
as an issue of their implementation. This method, however, as was presented in presented 
by Mercadal in [16] can suffer of high sensitivity to modeling error and noise. 
• Parameter identification (PID) is also used to generate residuals by producing estimations 
of characteristic coefficients of the system that experience unexpected changes when in 
presence of upset condition. Broussard and Trahan illustrated in [17] the use of two such 
techniques for detecting failures on both the armature winding resistance of a Direct 
Current (DC) servomotor and an analog second order-system presenting as the main 
problem the need for persistent excitation for successful parameter identification. Meyer 
and Zakrajsek applied PID techniques to detect failures in rocket engines test firing data 
in [18] using a limited database of failed and nominal firings with no sensor failures 
present; it is described in this work that the presence of sensor failures may trigger false 
alarms and would require extra tuning to cope with this abnormalities. Also in an 
aerospace context, Melody et al. compared in [19] the performance of three different PID 
techniques for in-flight detection and identification of aircraft icing and presented a 
detailed analysis of accuracy and velocity of detection from which the use of the H∞ 
algorithm for low levels of excitation of the system.  
Knowledge based techniques become useful when a detailed or accurate model of the system is 
not available or simply too complicated to obtain. Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques such as Neural 
Networks (NNs) and Fuzzy Logic have been used among knowledge based systems for failure detection 
and identification. NNs have the capacity of adaptation to changing environments by changing the 
weights of the different components of the network. The adaptation process of NNS is referred to as 
learning and allows the NN to adjust its performance to a desired behavior. NNs turn out to be very useful 
tools when dealing with highly non-linear problems [10]. Fuzzy Logic gives a tool to translate human 
thought process to computer processes thus allowing operators experience to be included in the detection 
logic. These two techniques have been used to develop logic maps that can detect failure signatures based 
on NNs estimations and expert assessment. 
Neural Networks have been proposed to deal with failure conditions as early as the work by 
Elsley et al. [20] and Dietz et al. [21] in the end of the 80s. Napolitano et al. have shown in many research 
papers such as [22; 23; 24; 25] the validity of using NNs for failure detection and accommodation for 
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upset sensors and actuators for airplane systems. Perhinschi et al. have also published papers in the same 
area like [26; 27] in which more robust thresholds and logic schemes are implemented to allow more 
flexibility to the detection process. Most of this work focused on high performance aircraft or Unmanned 
Air Vehicles (UAVs); however, Pesonen et al. proposed in [28] a NN based controller for general aviation 
airplanes capable of adaptation to faulty conditions requiring little or no pilot compensation. 
Nevertheless, this early work was based on PC based simulations and did not include lateral failures nor 
pilot in the loop interactions. The following two references show the versatility of the NN approach. First, 
the work proposed by Liu et al. in [29] using a two-stage improved Elman Neural Network model to 
perform failure detection on a hydraulic servo system shows the strengths of NNs approaches to 
overcome strong nonlinearities. Lastly, the work developed by Tarng et al. in [30] employed a multi-layer 
feed-forward neural network with Back-Propagation Algorithm (BPA) to detect abnormal situations in 
milling processes. 
The concept of Fuzzy Logic isolated from any NN structure has not been widely used and one of 
the few works that can be referenced is that of Curry et al. [31] that applied a robust l1 estimator to 
calculate residuals. These residuals were judged using fuzzy thresholds that allow for an extra evaluation 
of the abnormal conditions. Most research has focused on using Fuzzy Logic as a combination with NN 
scheme thus creating the so-called Neuro-fuzzy schemes. Chen et al. created in [32] a sensor fusion 
algorithm based on “applying fuzzy logic to give a neural network real time adaptability to compensate 
for faulty sensors” [32]. In general, the inclusion of fuzzy components in the NN detection schemes tends 
to increase the flexibility and robustness. 
Most of the research detailed throughout this section has focused on individual classes of failures, 
not dealing with the need for comprehensive FDI schemes that can detect both expected/known failures 
and have the potential of provide acceptable detection capabilities for completely unforeseen situations. 
Integrating a variety of failures plus making the scheme robust enough to deal with wide ranges of the 
operational point, forces the FDI scheme to be capable of dealing with an increasing number of 
dimensions. It is in this context that the Artificial Immune System (AIS) concept emerged as a promising 
tool for developing more comprehensive failure detection schemes. This rather new biologically inspired 
technique has specific characteristics that allow it to deal with complex multidimensional problems and 
large amounts of information. 
The mammalian immune system provided inspiration to many recent biologically motivated 
techniques that can be grouped under the so called Artificial Immune System techniques that emerged in 
the 1990s. The first scientific meeting with immunity based models as a center of attention was the 
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international workshop “Immunity-based Systems” held in Japan in December 10, 1996. Two years after 
this conference, Dasgupta put together a set of publications regarding this novel branch of CI in the form 
of a book [33], that served to establish more formally some of the theories and principles being used by 
researchers around the globe. By 2002, the AIS had gained such importance that a conference exclusive 
on AIS related topics was created called International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems 
(ICARIS) that continues to operate regularly once a year since then. 
One of the first applications of AIS principles for failure detection purposes in contained in [34] 
for a particular application to intrusion detection on a computer network. This early work presents the use 
of a Negative Selection algorithm based on the way the mammalian immune system allows only 
maturation of antibodies that do not attack the body’s own cells. Since these early stages, the theories 
referred to the AIS have been perfected and the applications have been diversified. Dasgupta and Forrest 
presented in [35] in 1998 a more formal view to the application of the NS approach to intrusion detection; 
however it took 10 years from the first appearance of the NS algorithm for Dasgupta to propose a real-
valued failure detection scheme for application to aircraft subsystem failures in [36]. 
Some authors like Stepney et al. [37] have made considerable efforts to lay more formality onto 
AIS application in general, while others as Pasek in [38] have tried to formalize the theory behind a 
particular application such as the Negative Selection. Most failure detection applications of the AIS 
techniques such as [39; 40; 41] have used benchmark type of data to assess the detection capabilities of 
different algorithms to generate antibodies. Some of the practical applications of the AIS are the 
implementation in [42] of an FDI scheme for milling operation tool breakage, the application of danger 
theory for detection of erroneous communications inside a telephone network presented in [43] and the 
Negative Selection algorithm using binary representation used in [44] to assess the correct performance of 
refrigeration systems. The work by Ayara et al. [45] deserves a more extensive comment as it explores a 
combination of AIS techniques tending to create a system capable of immunizing a network of 
Automated Teller Machines (ATMs). This proposed system presents real time adaptation that intends to 
mimic the constant learning process of the natural immune system, while it also implements a vaccination 
concept via which one ATM can provide the rest of the network with information about local 
abnormalities to improve the global strength of the network to possible succeeding occurrences. 
Besides the already mentioned application to airplane failure detection, two more works were 
focused on airplane subsystem failures. In 2004 Dasgupta et al. published [46], a research work primarily 
focused in showing the validity and importance of the presence of an accurate FDI scheme on top of any 
IFC available to reduce dead bands caused by adaptation times to unexpected situations. It was stated in 
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this paper that knowing beforehand that the airplane is not working under healthy conditions can help 
trigger faster and more accurate responses of the IFC system. This effort used high level simulations of a 
C17 transport aircraft to test the validity of the approach “The parameters considered for the fault 
detection study included body-axes commanded rates, actual aircraft body-axes rates, and corresponding 
neural network outputs.” [46]. One year later, Wong et al. presented in [47] an extension of the previous 
year’s work. In this case, the focus was in implementing a top layer to the system that allowed correct 
adaptation without the need for supervised identification. This automation layer provides this scheme with 
the capability to recognize the effects of the failures that it detects and thus modify the IFC accordingly. It 
is stated here that such a system can also provide accurate information to the pilot that can improve 
his/hers situational awareness therefore increasing the possibilities of a successful completion of the 
mission. As the preceding one, this paper also presents results using state of the art simulations of a C17 
transport aircraft. 
1.2. Research Objectives  
The present work forms a constituent part of an extensive venture among West Virginia 
University’s Center for Advanced Research in Autonomous Technology (CARAT) research group titled 
“Design, Simulation, Validation, and Flight-Testing of Adaptive Fault-Tolerant Flight Control Systems”. 
This project is part of the NASA Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR). 
This project represents a continuation of the effort by the West Virginia University (WVU) team to 
advance both the state-of-the-art in fault-tolerant flight control theory and the state-of-the-practice in 
control system validation and testing methods. The primary objective of this research is the development 
of an integrated adaptive flight control system capable of detecting, identifying, and accommodating for 
both sensor and actuator failures in real-time. A complete system development cycle will be defined and 
demonstrated including conceptual and detailed design, PC-based and motion-based simulations, model-
based software verification and validation (V&V), and incremental flight-testing validation. 
Over the previous decade researchers at WVU have extensively investigated different adaptive 
architectures for on-line sensor and actuator fault diagnosis and accommodation. In addition, the WVU 
team has worked closely and effectively with researchers from NASA Dryden Flight Research Center 
towards developing and flight-testing several flight control laws for the NASA Intelligent Flight Control 
System (IFCS) program. This effort is aligned in the general area of fault-tolerant systems dealing with 
failures to the actuators of primary control surfaces as well as to different sensors in the flight control 
system. 
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The present research is a continuation of this sequence of research efforts that also included 
implementation of different detection schemes and assessment of their performance. Previous work has 
dealt mainly with data generated using state of the art simulations; however, this work represents the first 
effort among this research group that deals with real flight data for FDI implementation. 
The present thesis describes the design and implementation of an immunity based FDI scheme for 
actuator failures using real flight data from a small jet Unmanned Air Vehicle. The first objective is to 
check the power of the Artificial Immune System paradigm for FDI using the available flight data. The 
second objective is to assess the performance for known failures and estimate its extension to unknown 
failures – this is one of the main advantages of this particular technique as is explained in the following 
chapters. Finally, a comparison of different FDIs is carried out to investigate the benefits and drawbacks 
of different FDI techniques. 
1.3. Overview of the Thesis 
The next chapter outlines the AIS paradigm starting from the biological inspiration and following 
to its application to failure detection in aircraft sub-systems including details of the different algorithms 
involved in the creation of the FDI scheme. Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the UAV used for 
flight testing as well as the depiction of the totality of the data used. This chapter also presents the motion 
based simulator used for the comparison of failure detection schemes and explanations of each scheme’s 
particular details. The design process of the FDI scheme using the AIS paradigm is discussed in Chapter 4 
detailing the particular design decisions involved. The results obtained using the produced FDI scheme 
are summarized in Chapter 5. A simple comparison of FDI approaches is also included in this chapter. 
Conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6 together with possible future extensions of the present work. 
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Chapter 2: IMMUNE SYSTEM 
“Immunology can be defined as the study of the defense mechanisms that confer resistance 
against diseases. The system whose main function is to protect our bodies against the constant attack of 
external microorganisms is called the immune system.” [48 p. 9] 
All vertebrates are equipped with a protection structure that helps them defend against dangers 
such as viruses, bacteria, etc. This is the immune system and it consists of various types of cells that 
fulfill specific functions; nevertheless, it depends also on a series of organs for its maintenance and 
evolution. 
The Natural Immune System (NIS) constitutes a complex adaptive system that work in a 
decentralized way to detect and isolate possible threats to the organism, moreover, among other features, 
it also induces actions against these menaces (immune responses) and retains in memory previous positive 
detections to increase detection speed in the future. The NIS provided inspiration to many recent 
biologically motivated techniques that can be grouped under the so called AIS techniques. 
Computer science helped develop many models in order to replicate biological phenomena. 
Moreover, these phenomena have also been used as metaphors that serve as inspiration to create new 
computational techniques capable of solving problems in a variety of disciplines [48]. These techniques 
are contained in the broader field of Computational Intelligence (CI), and form a separate branch referred 
to as Biology-Inspired Methods. Neural networks, evolutionary computation, and fuzzy systems can be 
included in this branch [49]. The AIS is one of the latest additions to this area and as such has 
experienced a great boost to try to explore its strengths as a CI technique. The previous is shown in the 
following figure showing also some of the different branches inside the AIS. 
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Figure 1: Artificial Immune System as a branch of Computational Intelligence [49]. 
2.1. Natural Immune System 
This section does not intend to be a complete description of the processes and components 
involved in the NIS, however it is intended to give a broad view in all the aspects involved in such a 
complex and multilayered system. Although particularly clarified in some paragraphs, the main references 
for this section are [48] and [50]. 
Immunology is a rather new science that can track its roots back to the end of the 18th century, 
when Edward Jenner discovered the principles of vaccination as a way to immunize animals to certain 
diseases, even decades before science gained a decent understanding of the processes triggered by this 
phenomenon. The concept of antibodies was introduced in the early years of the 19th century; however, 
even 50 years after their first appearance, questions were still to be answered as to the processes involved 
in their creation and their actual role in the protection of the body. The theories of clonal-selection, 
negative selection and immune network were all formulated in the second half of the past century. These 
latter theories together with others not mentioned in this extremely brief historical account and introduced 
in the same time frame clarify the youth of this field in science. [48] 
The immune system consists of an intricate arrangement of cells and molecules designed to 
protect the host’s body against the constant attacks of antigens. It is constituted of two layers of defense, 
the innate immune system and the adaptive immune system, both of which depend upon activity of white 
blood cells, called leukocytes. These leukocytes can be divided considering the presence of granules into 
granulocytes and agranulocytes and the latter can also be subdivided into lymphocytes, monocytes, and 
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macrophages. Granulocytes and macrophages are mainly involved in the innate immune system while 
lymphocytes constitute the main part of the adaptive immune system. 1  
The cells involved in the innate immune system are conceived to deal with many antigens even 
before any exposure of the body to these particular threats constituting a front line that directly attacks 
these extraneous cells. It is called innate because the reactions to particular hazards are equivalent in 
different healthy individuals. This initial immune response also helps triggering a sequence of reactions 
that activate the adaptive immune system. 
The adaptive immune system implies a learning capacity of the immune system and thus requires 
the body to be exposed to particular antigens. This exposure triggers the creation of more specialized cells 
that provide a faster reaction to future exposures to the same antigen. This learning process consumes 
time and thus requires the presence of innate responses; however, in the future it fastens the response to 
already known antigens. Lymphocytes are responsible for both recognition and elimination of these alien 
entities. There are two main types of Lymphocytes, T-cells (T-lymphocytes) and B-cells (B-
lymphocytes). Each naïve lymphocyte (lymphocytes before maturation process) carries surface antigen 
receptors of single specificity (monospecificity). This specificity is determined during the creation of 
lymphocytes and consists of a gene rearrangement that can create millions of different variants of the 
encoding genes. The surface antigen receptors of B-cells are particularly called antibodies while their T-
cells counterparts do not have a specific name and are generally referred to as T-cell receptors. 
The first major responsibility of the immune system is to differentiate all the cells within the body 
and classify these cells as self or non-self (pattern recognition). The antigen receptors mentioned above 
are basically surface molecules capable of recognizing antigens binding to determined protein chains 
found as well on the surface of the antigens. While lymphocytes are said to be monospecific, antigen 
might present several different types of protein chains in their surface, which implies that several 
lymphocytes can bind to each particular antigen. The binding process can be understood as a key and lock 
phenomenon, where binding occurs only when the two components match. 
                                                     
1 Some authors [50] distinguish a third layer of defense to be the anatomic barrier consisting of skin, the mucous 
membranes, and bony encasements. 
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Figure 2: Simplified view of the pattern recognition mechanisms involved in the NIS. [51] 
The production, evolution and distribution of the described cells, specially the lymphocytes, 
involve a set of organs called lymphoid organs. These lymphoid organs can be divided into primary or 
central organs, responsible for the production and maturation of lymphocytes, and secondary or peripheral 
organs, where lymphocytes experience stimulation inducing the adaptive immune responses. The 
following figure shows the main lymphoid organs. 
 
Figure 3: Anatomy of the immune system (lymphoid organs) [48] 
Describing each of these organs is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, the two primary 
lymphoid organs deserve a short description of their role in the immune system: 
• Bone marrow: Is a soft tissue found inside the most elongated bones. It houses stem cells 
that then become white and red blood cells. Is the main supplier of blood cells. 
• Thymus: It is a glandule located behind the sternum, above and in front of the heart. It 
provides the required environment for T-cells maturation. 
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Both B-cells and T-cells are created in the bone marrow; however, the maturation process of B-
cells occurs also in the bone marrow, while T-cells mature inside the thymus. 
“The immune system in its ability to recognize antigens is complete. The antibody molecules and 
T-cell receptors produced by the lymphocytes of an animal can recognize any molecule, either self or 
non-self, even those artificially synthesized.” [48 p. 36]. The previous phrase simply states that the 
immune system is assumed to comply with the completeness axiom and means that part of the initially 
random generated lymphocytes reacts to the own body cells. This is not acceptable considering that, as 
was mentioned before, lymphocytes are the main pattern recognition tool in the self-non-self 
discrimination. Lymphocytes then experience a censoring or selection processes to avoid the phenomena 
of autoimmunity. There are two main such mechanisms used by the immune system: 
• Positive Selection (PS): Impedes the natural process of cell death for necessary 
lymphocytes. 
o T-cells experience what is called thymic positive selection (in the thymus) by 
which cells that bind with specific molecules (self-MHC [48]) are selected and 
their lifespan is increased. 
o B-cells experience a similar process, selecting cells that can recognize particular 
non-self molecules in the presence of T-cell activation signals. 
• Negative Selection (NS): Results in the death of a lymphocyte due to binding with self 
cells. For this purpose, the primary lymphoid organs contain big sets of self-cells. 
o T-cells NS can occur in the thymus or in the secondary lymphoid organs. The 
process basically consists in exposing the T-cells to a collection of self-cells and 
eliminating the ones that experience activation. 
o B-cells NS occurs in the bone marrow or in the secondary lymphoid organs and 
is similar to the above explained process; however, the cells that are eliminated 
are the ones that get activated without the necessary presence of an activated T-
cell. 
These two censoring and selection mechanisms have as a consequence that no matured 
lymphocyte activates immune responses against self cells. Once the lymphocytes are matured, they are 
sent throughout the body to perform their described tasks locally. 
There are two types of responses the Immune System experiences when the adaptive immune 
system detects an antigen: 
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• Humoral Immune Response (antibody mediated) is triggered by an activated B-cell 
secreting antibodies that bind to the detected antigen to mark it thus summoning other 
active cells such as phagocites to destroy the aggressor. 
• Cellular Immune Response (cell mediated) occurs after a T-cell has been activated 
becoming what is called effector. Effectors trigger the proliferation of similar specificity 
receptors in the area surrounding the antigen. It also produces secretion of chemicals with 
the purpose of eliminating the threat. 
The number of lymphocytes that can bind to a particular antigen is limited and thus depends on 
adaptive processes to favor the reproduction of successful lymphocytes. This adaptive process is called 
clonal selection theory (or clonal expansion principle) and involves mainly B-cells. After a B-cell 
becomes active it is helped by other accessory cells to allow stimulation by the antigen. This stimulation 
results in the proliferation (division) of such B-cells and their following maturation into antibody 
secreting cells called plasma cells. 
Learning in the context of the immune system involves increasing the number of clones in the 
lymphocytes population of the antibodies that have experienced positive successful activations thus 
generating a biased distribution in contrast with the original ideal random distribution. The global 
population of lymphocytes circulating throughout the body is considerably large and is kept somewhat 
constant; therefore an increase in the number of clones on one type of antibody produces in consequence 
a drop in the occurrence of other antibodies considered less important. This does not mean that after an 
infection, the immune system maintains a large number of clones of these successful antibodies; on the 
contrary, it only maintains in memory a small set of the best fit antibodies for this particular infection. 
This small set of cells kept latent are called memory cells and help speed up the response of the immune 
system after a first infection on account of their availability for cloning purposes in case the same antigen 
is detected in the future. 
There is a somewhat parallel theory formally proposed by Jerne in [52] in 1974 named Immune 
Network Theory (or Idiotypic Network Theory). This theory presents a different approach to many of the 
processes involved in the immune system such as memory, learning, self/non-self discrimination, etc. The 
basis of this theory states that the immune system is composed mainly of a regulated network of 
molecules and cells that recognize themselves even in the absence of antigens. As can be easily inferred, 
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this theory is clearly in conflict with the clonal selection theory. The details of this concept are beyond the 
scope of this brief introduction to immunology.2 
2.2. Artificial Immune System 
The set of techniques inspired in the behavior of the Natural Immune System are referred to as 
Artificial Immune System techniques. This section presents first an overview of the characteristics of the 
NIS that are valuable for other fields of science and then introduces the models created to mimic these 
features. A special subsection is dedicated to the Negative Selection principle that represents the main 
technique used for this thesis. 
2.2.1. Computational aspects of the NIS 
“From an information-processing perspective, the NIS is a remarkable parallel and distributed 
adaptive system with (partial) decentralized control mechanism.” [49]. There are several characteristics 
that make the NIS a good metaphor for solving engineering problems, and thus, from a computational 
point of view, the following is a list of such characteristics: 
• Recognition: Self-non-self discrimination in the immune system represents the NIS’s 
ability to recognize particular patterns and act accordingly. This concept is greatly related 
with the amount of information available a priori to the NIS. [33] [53]. 
• Diversity: To be able to deal with either known or unknown antigens, the creation of the 
lymphocytes relies in part on a genetic process that allows that any antigen at least binds 
with some of these lymphocytes improving robustness. [33]  
• Learning: The NIS learns from experience increasing the chances of detecting an antigen 
after the first infection by regulating the proliferation of specialized lymphocytes. 
• Memory: After positive activation, keeps a small amount of the most specialized cells 
that detected the threat as memory cells to be used in the event of a second infection. 
• Distributed detection: As the lymphocytes perform the detection processes locally, there 
is no central control unit necessary for leading the immune responses. This also implies 
that local failures in the detection do not produce global failure of the system. 
                                                     
2 Details of this theory can be found in [48] in section 2.11, page 41. 
15 
• Threshold mechanism: Immune responses depend not only on a single cell binding but on 
the reaction of adjacent cells after the first activation that depends on the strength of the 
chemical binging. [33] 
• Dynamic protection: The NIS is constantly discarding cells and creating new ones. 
Clonal selection, as well as other such mechanisms, is used to favor exploration over 
exploitation. 
• Probabilistic detection: The detection is approximate; a lymphocyte can bind with 
different antigens with similar molecular structures. 
• Robustness: Is a consequence of the NIS being diverse, distributed, and error tolerant. 
[54] 
Other features of NIS important from a computational point of view are: adaptability, specificity, 
reinforcement learning, parallel processing, multi layered, no centralized control, self tolerance, co-
stimulation, self regulation, etc. 
2.2.2. AIS techniques 
All the characteristics described in the previous section have allowed researchers to develop 
models of one or many such mechanisms to be implemented not only as models of the NIS itself but as 
metaphors to solve other science problems. There is a vast diversity of models based on the NIS and thus 
included in the AIS techniques that have been explored, however this section includes a brief review of 
the most applied ones only. 
The immune network model is based primarily on the theory first expressed by Jerne in [52] by 
which B-cells produce a network that produces bindings even in the absence of stimulatory antigens. This 
model generates a starting population and then uses cloning and mutation processes based on the 
interconnections experienced when the initial population is exposed to training data. At each new step, the 
algorithm attempts to incorporate new cells to the remaining network using affinity criteria. Lack of this 
affinity produces the elimination of such individuals. Immune network models have proven their use in 
problems that involve learning such as pattern recognition [55], clustering [56], and data mining [57], 
among others. 
The bone marrow model uses a gene library concept as information basis for the generation of 
individuals. This gene library contains pieces of a solution that has been determined a priori [53]. The 
production of such antibodies uses random concatenation and the newly created individuals are evaluated 
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for affinity using a fitness function. This model has not been extensively used in literature; however, [58] 
makes use of the gene library concept to solve scheduling problems. 
The Clonal selection algorithm (based on the principle of the same name) is another of the AIS 
techniques and has some similarities with the genetic evolution. The main difference between genetic 
evolution and the clonal selection principle is the time frame. The NIS relies on this principle for the 
generation of significant changes in rather short periods of time in the order of hours (to help in the 
adaptive immune response). The developed algorithm selects well fit individuals, performs cloning and in 
the process favors the maturation of the best fit ones. Moreover, during the maturation process it performs 
hypermutation (high levels of mutation) to promote exploration of spaces close to the best fit individuals. 
This algorithm provides a successful method for searching complex spaces [53]. Among other areas, this 
algorithm has been used for learning and optimization [59], pattern recognition [39], and anomaly 
detection [60]. 
Positive selection was informally described by Ebner et al. in [61] and formally by Stibot et al. in 
[62]. This technique has been applied both to binary-string as well as real-valued cases using self data as 
detectors and applying some particular constant matching rule. The benefits of this technique according to 
[63] is that no training is required while the main drawback is said to be the computational cost in view of 
the amount of self data that is used. Moreover, Ji and Dasgupta state in [64] that “when the number of self 
samples is larger than the number of detectors by more than one order of magnitude, such positive 
selection method like Self-Detector is not a realistic solution”. Not many applications of this method can 
be found in literature applied to real world problems. The above mentioned work by Stibor et al. [62] uses 
KDD Cup 1999 data set for intrusion detection on a computer network while Ji and Dasgupta used Iris-
Fisher and Biomedical datasets for their analysis in [63]. All the mentioned datasets are usual benchmarks 
for comparing novelty detection methods. 
Negative selection algorithm was initially proposed by Forrest et al. in 1994 [34] using binary 
representation and it tries to emulates the maturation process of T-cells in the thymus in which cells that 
get activated in the presence of self cells are discarded in what is called self/non-self discrimination. Due 
to the importance of this technique for the present AIS implementation, a more detailed description of the 
algorithm is presented in the following subsection. The main applications of this method are in the area of 
anomaly or novelty detection in timed series [35] and computer virus detection [65]. 
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2.2.2.1. Overview of negative selection algorithm 
The NS algorithm in general can be summarized in three main steps [35]: 
1. Definition of the self as a collection S of normal patterns/activities corresponding to 
stable behavior of the process/system that needs to be monitored. This data needs to be 
normalized into a finite feature space U. 
2. Generation of a set R of detectors, each of which fails to match any of the elements of S. 
A way to generate these detectors is by randomly generating individuals inside U and 
only using the ones that comply with the criteria. This random generation can also serve 
as a first step to the use of other growth algorithms to optimize detector distribution. 
3. Monitor new observations for changes by continually checking for matches of new 
incoming data with the set R. 
This absolutely general description of the NS algorithm applies to almost every implementation 
of this algorithm found in literature. The differences arise when dealing with the details in each of these 
steps. First, it is important to formally define the sets mentioned earlier. U is the universe of possibilities 
for the data observed from the process being monitored and is partitioned into two subsets which are 
called from now on Self (S) and Non-self (N) with the following properties [54]: 
  (2.1) U S N= ∪
  (2.2) S N∩ =∅
The type of data that forms U produces the first main division. Most NS algorithms have dealt 
either with binary string or real valued representations, however, some hybrid approaches have also used 
integers, categorical information, boolean values, text information, etc. [66]. The principal consequence 
of the choice for representation would be the possible matching rules that can be implemented to check a 
new data point as included in S or in N. The matching rule represents a way to interpret the relative 
distance between an arriving data instance and a specific data point. Matching rules allow for partial 
matching, in which case, the incoming data only needs to be “close” to the detector to establish a match. 
Matching rules can be combined or replaced with a matching threshold. 
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There are three main binary strings matching rules usually reported in literature, this being r-
contiguous bits, Hamming distance and r-chunk matching rules. The definitions are not included in this 
document as the implementation is based on a real-valued approach.3 
For the case of real-valued representations (or vector representations), each data point is a vector 
of size n – one component per dimension used. Distance in an n-dimensional space can be addressed in 
many different ways; however, for a distance definition ( ),d x y  between the points x  and y  to be valid 
it must comply with the following metric properties [67]: 
• Non-negativity: ( ), 0d x y ≥  
• Reflexivity: ( ), 0  iff  d x y x y= =  
• Symmetry: ( ) ( ), ,d x y d y x=  
• Triangle inequality: ( ) ( ) ( ), ,d x y d y z d x z+ ≥ ,  
One distance that complies with this definition is the Euclidean distance that can be expressed as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )21 1, n nd x y x y x y= − + + −
2
 (2.3) 
However, Euclidean distance can be interpreted as a particular case of Minkowski distance (λ-













⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= − ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  (2.4) 
This definition of distance complies with the requirements stated before for any value of λ . 
Reference [66] presents a thorough discussion about a variety of definitions of distance for real valued 
representations. On the limit, when λ , Minkowski distance tends to: →∞
 ( ) ( ) {lim , , max ,  for 1, ,i id x y d x y x y i nλλ ∞→∞ = = − = }  (2.5) 
                                                     
3 A simplified explanation of these methods as well as further references can be found in [66]. 
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All these definition are useful for the following section where the particular implementation is 
described. 
The set N is usually considerably larger than S and using the entire set for detection purposes is 
often impractical. To cover N it is necessary to define detectors that can act as the antibodies 
computational counterparts. These detectors, represented by circumscribed geometrical hyper-bodies, 
report a match whenever an incoming data instance is found to be inside its boundaries. Any of the 
previously shown distance definitions can be used to describe the limits of hyper-bodies; however, the 
choice produces changes in the physical image of such a geometrical body. The hyper-bodies most 
commonly used for real-valued NS algorithms are: 
• Hyper-Rectangles are defined as a vector D  composed of two other vectors c  and s : 
 ( ),D c s=  (2.6) 
Where c  is a vector of size n that represents the center and  is a vector of the same size 
that contains the side of the hyper-rectangle for each dimension. Hyper-cubes are a 
particular case where  is actually a scalar. In this type of detectors, no overlapping is 
usually allowed greatly simplifying calculations such as coverage [68]. 
s
s
• Hyper-spheres are defined as a vector, as shown in (2.6), where s  is a scalar and 
corresponds to the radius. Different definitions of distance cause changes in the shape of 
the spheres from the intuitive (Euclidean) idea of such geometric body. The effects of 
these changes are analyzed and explained in following sections. 
• Hyper-ellipsoids of rotation are described also by a vector containing the center c  and 
two values for the axes included in s . 
• Generalized hyper-ellipsoids are described by a vector containing the center c  and n 
values for the different axes included in s . 
There are other hyper-bodies that would be valid for NS detection; however favoring 
computational simplicity the four above mentioned have been the most used ones. Hyper-spheres are used 
as detectors in the present implementation and so a more detailed description of the particularities 
involved is included in following chapters. 
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The desire when creating detectors is to maximize the coverage of N. If any of the last three 
shapes described above is used, it is necessary to allow some overlapping between detectors or there 
would not be a possibility to cover “holes” in between them. This overlapping is a burden when 
calculations such as volume of detectors or coverage are needed; however, the benefit of using a simpler 
hyper-shape pays off for this inconvenience. 
Coverage calculation in higher dimensions is a challenging task. Stibor et al. presented in [67] a 
brief description of the use of Monte Carlo method for obtaining a measure of both coverage and 
overlapping between detectors. The method has probabilistic basis and consists mainly of the following 
steps: 
1. Given a subset A  of the universe U  that is defined using n  dimensions 
2. Generate a set T  of P  random points using a uniform distribution. 
3. Calculate the size of A T∩  as AP  
4. The coverage is calculated as AP P  
In the case of this AIS application, the subset A is a set of hyper-bodies, U is the hypercube in 
which the totality of the self data is contained and the calculation of AP  is performed using the concept of 
distance to check how many of the  points in T  are contained inside the bounds of at least one of the 
hyper-shapes in 
P
A . Stibor et al. also state in [67] that this method has an error independent of n  and of 
order 1 P . It also describes that “…specifying a confidence level 1 , one can determine the smallest 
sample size  that guarantees an integration error no larger than ” [67]. This is called the “...
η−
εP ( ),ε η  







⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥
 (2.7) 
Overlapping calculations are performed in a similar fashion. In this case, after a point in T  has 
been found to belong to the dominions of one hyper=body in A , the rest of A  is checked to find if the 
same point belongs also to another. The size of the subset of points in T  that are found to belong to more 
than one element in A  is . The overlapping is then calculated as OP O AP P . 
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Most NS based algorithms perform the generation of detectors offline because of the complexity 
and computational cost of such a process; however, they benefit of the relatively low cost of monitoring 
an already defined set of detectors for online operation. 
As the NS method relies on the use of geometrical tools in high dimensional space, it is important 
to mention the phenomenon known as “curse of dimensionality”. This phenomenon that was first 
mentioned by Bellman [69] is responsible for many issues regarding NS algorithms using high 
dimensional real-valued spaces. The following is an extract from [67] with a simple example regarding 
this phenomenon: “For example, given a function defined on a unitary hypercube of dimension n, in each 
dimension 10 discrete points are considered for evaluating the function. In dimension n = 2, this results 
in 100 evaluations, whereas in dimension n = 10, 1010 function evaluations are required.” This has 
undesirable consequences in the first step of random generation of detectors as the number of evaluations 
needed to accomplish a certain resolution follows similar trends as the ones presented in the example. 
Moreover, this phenomenon has implications in the properties of hyper-spheres in higher dimensional 
spaces with the most important being that the volume tends to 0 if n  goes to infinity. This means that for 
a constant radius, hyper-spheres generally cover less detection space N as  increases. Stibor et al. 
showed in [67] that for a determined radius, there is a dimension for which the volume is a maximum and 
any decrease or increase in dimension would produce a decrease in the space covered. They also showed 
that hyper-spheres with radius of 1 or less experience their maximum volume in dimensions less than 6. A 
consequence of high-dimensional spaces is that to maintain a constant coverage percentage of N (constant 
detection resolution) using a determined hyper-body, exponentially more detectors need to be defined 
[68]. 
n
Dasgupta presents in [49] a list of factors that play an important role in the successful 
performance of an NS algorithm: 
• Algorithm for generating detectors: Detectors quality depends upon the success of this 
algorithm. 
• Number and coverage of detectors: More detectors with less overlapping increase the 
chances of detecting data that belongs to N. The need for more detectors undermines the 
algorithms efficiency in generating the detectors and in monitoring activation. 
• Applicability of scenario: In general, problems that are suitable for this technique require 
availability of a large amount of self data (in contrast with problems with more existing 
upset data). 
• For real-valued NS algorithms: 
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o Curse of dimensionality: Its effect in the particular application needs to be 
understood. 
o Estimation of coverage: In dimensions above 3, the accuracy of the coverage 
estimation needs to be addressed as no exact measure can be implemented. 
o Selection of distance measure: As explained before, consequences are expected 
of different choices of distance definition. 
The theoretical foundation of this method is still a work in progress; however, Ji and Dasgupta 
describe in [66] the main advantages of a NS approach as being: 
• No prior knowledge of non-self is required. 
• Detection is distributed not requiring communication between detectors. 
• It can hide the self concept. This benefit is mostly acknowledged when privacy is an issue 
and the negative selection aids in only storing negative representation of the information 
for querying purposes [70]. 
2.2.3. AIS techniques for aircraft sub-system failure detection 
This implementation is based mainly on the use of a Real-valued NS algorithm. For the aircraft 
AIS-based FDI, the self is defined as a collection of all the possible combinations of parameters that are 
representative of normal operations. A subset of these parameters needs to be specified such that this 
division contains dynamic signatures that can show difference with or without failures. These variables 
are called identifiers and play a similar role to the molecules that form the antigen receptors of 
Lymphocytes. Candidate identifiers can be grouped in the following categories [68]: 
1. Aircraft state variables 
2. Pilot input variables 
3. Stability and control derivatives 
4. Variables generated within control laws 
5. Derived variables 
For the test-bed used, and as is explained in the following chapter, categories 1 and 2 are 
available and variables in category 5 could be experimented. Aircraft state variables represent the first 
intuitive choice; however, Perhinschi et al. showed in [68] that similar combinations of state variables can 
be achieved either by faulty conditions or by coupled pilot inputs and so stated that pilot input 
information is needed for correct failure detection. 
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Selection of identifiers is not a simple process; however, knowledge of the system is the major 
instrument for a successful selection. The critical process of selecting the identifiers is performed through 
a limited “trial and error” approach as shown in Figure 4. Several combinations of candidate identifiers 
were tested to define alternative selves. These selves were used as detector sets using a Positive Selection 
approach to assess their validity using a limited set of test data. The best set of identifiers is then chosen 
to design the FDI scheme. 
 
Figure 4: Selection of identifiers for AIS-Based FDI - General block diagram. 
Positive detection consists of monitoring incoming data points to check if they are within the 
limits of at least one cluster thus detecting this point as belonging to the self. Acceptable results for this 
evaluation imply that a percentage of at least 50% of the validation data is correctly detected while no 
more than 2% of the failed data is mistakenly detected. The clustering process is described in subsection 




Once the identifiers have been selected, the database consists of a cloud of data points in an n-
dimensional space. The distance between the points is critical for the detection process and different 
scales of the identifiers are not desired; therefore, the data must be normalized. This normalization is 
made such that the self data is contained inside the hypercube [ , where  is the number of 
dimensions involved. Moreover, the normalization is such that the self data is located around the center of 
the hypercube. 
]0,1 n n
First the minimum and maximum of all data for each dimension is calculated as: 
 {max ,  for 1, ,j ij }M x i= = n  (2.8) 
 {min ,  for 1, ,j ijm x i= = }n  (2.9) 
Where  is an index that accounts for the different dimensions involved (from 1 to ), i m j  is an 
index that accounts for the number of points defining the self (from 1 to ), and n ijx  is a raw data point. 
Then, for each ijx  point, the following values are calculated: 









Where ijx  is an intermediate step and ijx  is the corresponding normalized value. 
2.2.3.2. Clustering 
The data points are clustered to reduce the amount of information the following processes have to 
deal with and also to avoid possible “holes” of healthy data not represented in the self database. For 
simplicity, the same hyper-body shape and definition of distance that is used for generating the detectors 
should be used. In this case, hyper-spheres are chosen and Euclidean distance. Clustering is performed 
using an improved k-means algorithm [71]. 
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The implemented algorithm essentially creates a random set C  of  centers (points) in the  
dimensional space using a uniform distribution. It calculates then the relative distances between these 
centers and the points in the set  of self data. Each point in  is assigned a membership to the closest 
element in C . Each element  of the set C  is iteratively moved based on the mean of the points  
assigned to it. The algorithm converges when the distance  from each element c  to its assigned points 
in  is constant. For the case of hyper-spheres, the radius of the cluster is set to the maximum between 
the converged value of  and the minimum radius allowed . The algorithm used takes advantage of 











Figure 5: Clustering algorithm 
Clusters created with this algorithm include a (potentially) large number of self points and also a 
certain amount of “empty-space”. If a small number of clusters are generated, the size of each cluster will 
be large as compared to the distances between points and thus include a big amount of this “empty-space” 
and potentially non-self space. A consequence of this is an increase in the size of the space effectively 
considered as self (covered by the clusters). On the other extreme, if there are as many clusters as self 
data points, the spaces in between clusters may allow detectors to be placed in locations where healthy 
behavior may fall thus generating false activations. An analysis of the behavior of this algorithm 
regarding “empty-space” coverage is included in [68]. 
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Once a good trade-off has been accomplished between the number of clusters and “empty-space” 
coverage, the cluster set is formally referred to as the SELF. 
2.2.3.3. Detector generation 
Due to the high dimensionality of the problem, the detector generation process may be exposed to 
several specific issues [68]. One of these is that adequate coverage of the non-self may not be achieved 
with a reasonable computational effort. Different approaches are used to avoid this situation and are 
explained in the following. 
The present implementation is a side project of an extensive effort among the research group 
headed by Dr. Mario Perhinschi for creating a comprehensive AIS FDI schemes for the NASA IFCS F-15 
simulator [72]. For this broader project, a variety of algorithms have been studied, tested and evaluated 
and the result is a two phase evolutionary algorithm. The first phase consists of the Enhanced Negative 
Selection Algorithm for Real-Valued representation with variable detector radius (ENSA-RV) that 
ensures no overlapping with the self and guarantees certain coverage of the non-self [68]. The second 
phase uses Genetic Algorithms to optimize the already created set of detectors [73]. For the present 
implementation, only the first phase is used. The ENSA-RV algorithm steps can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Starts with a limited initial population of detectors whose centers are placed randomly in 
the non-self space. The radius of these detectors is set as the maximum possible before 
overlapping with a self cluster, meaning that the distance between centers is greater than 
or equal to the radius of the cluster plus the minimum radius minr  allowed for a detector.  
2. Detectors are evaluated for overlapping checking how much of a particular detector is 
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A fixed threshold  is established. If  the detectors are selected as matured 
while the remaining ones are selected as rejected.  
threw i threw w≤
3. Matured detectors experience a cloning process: 
a. Matured detectors with 0iw =  are placed in an area where no other detectors are 
found and as such are selected to have the most number of clones. A random 
unitary direction d  is calculated and a detector center is added at a distance 
equal to one radius. A number of  of centers are generated 
at 90º angles from the first distance in n  different planes. 
( )1 2 1CLONN n= − ⋅ −
b. Matured detectors with e  are placed in an area where not many 
detectors are found and as such are selected to have only one clone. The distance 
to all clusters and detectors is calculated and the closest is then selected. A 
unitary direction d
0 i thrw w< ≤
 is calculated opposite to the direction of the closest element. 
The distance to the new center, however, is controlled by two user-defined 
parameters CLONτ  and iniCLONη . The following decay parameter is needed to 
calculate the new center: 
  (2.14) / CLONiterCLON iniCLON e
τη η −= ⋅
  (2.15) ( )1clon mat CLON matc c rη= + + ⋅ ⋅d
CLONτ  grants that for the first iterations the cloned detectors will be placed farther 
away from the original cluster while the latter iterations will generate clones 
closer to the original detector.  is an initialization value involved in the 
calculation of  that directly affects the position of the new detector. 
iniCLONη
CLONη
4. A defined number MOVN  of rejected detectors are selected to face a moving process. 
These detectors are selected as the MOVN  smallest rejected detectors. The moving is 
performed using a similar decay factor as (2.14) but replacing MOVτ , MOVη  and  
instead of CLONτ , CLONη  and iniCLONη  respectively. The moved center is calculated as: 
iniMOVη
  (2.16) mov rej MOVc c η= + ⋅d
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The old rejected detector is removed from the database and replaced by this new one. 
5. A set of RDN  centers is inserted to explore areas of the hyperspace that may have not 
been explored in the first random placement of detectors. 
6. The maximum allowable radius is calculated for the cloned, moved and newly inserted 
centers. 
7. Calculate coverage and overlapping using Monte Carlo method with 0.98η=  and 
0.01ε= . 
8. Go back and perform steps #2 to #7 iteratively. The process stops when a determined 
number of iterations is reached, when the desired number of detectors is achieved or 
when a certain coverage is obtained. 




Figure 6: ENSA-RV algorithm 
This algorithm has been used for the implementation in [72]; however tests for the particular 
problem trying to solve in this theses showed that the algorithm favored too much big detectors and so 
very few detectors with radius under 0.1 were obtained. Dasgupta et al. explained in [36] that this is an 
expected behavior due to the use of the formulas (2.12) and (2.13) to calculate detector overlapping. This 
is found to be disadvantageous for detecting the failures implemented using the available identifiers. 
A second algorithm is then proposed using a vast portion of random generation. The algorithm is 
a one-shot type of algorithm similar to the V-detector algorithm presented in [74]. The V-detector 
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algorithm is extended and enhanced. This algorithm, that for this implementation is named #2, consists of 
the following steps: 
1. Generates a population of detectors whose centers are placed randomly in the non-self 
space. The radius of these detectors is set as the maximum possible before overlapping 
with a self cluster, meaning that the distance between centers is greater than or equal to 
the radius of the cluster plus the minimum radius allowed for a detector. 
A number of intervals of detectors sizes are defined. For each interval a determined 
number of detectors ( ) are forced to be placed and a number of clones ( ) is 
assigned. As is stated before, due to the “curse of dimensionality”, randomly obtaining 
detectors closer to the self is not an easy task and thus forcing the algorithm to provide a 
certain amount of such detectors increases the chances of obtaining better coverage in the 
very proximity of the self. 
RDN CLONN
2. The cloning process in this case is performed in a similar fashion as in the ENSA-RV 
algorithm. A random unitary direction is obtained and a new center is defined at a 
distance equal to: 
 clon RDc c RD= + ⋅d  (2.17) 
Where RD is a random number between 0 and 1. This step is repeated for as many times 
as the number of clones in the above mentioned table states; however, these centers are 
then evaluated to check that they fall in the non-self space and that the maximum allowed 
radius is bigger than the minimum threshold . minr
3. This population of detectors contains huge overlapping that needs to be addressed. The 
set of detectors is now processed using the same maturation process as the ENSA-RV but 
using a bigger threshold. The detectors that are found to be rejected are eliminated 
whereas the matured ones formed the final set. 
The following flowchart summarizes the process of detectors generation using algorithm #2. 
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Figure 7: Algorithm #2 
The computational costs of algorithm #2 and ENSA-RV are considerably different. For small 
populations (below 1000 detectors), algorithm #2 is considerably faster; however, if the population is 
increased, both algorithms become extremely slow. Also, for a population of less than 1000 detectors, the 
overlapping experienced by the detectors created using Algorithm #2 generates a set with poor coverage 
of the non-self space. 
Finally, as an enhancement tool for any of the two above mentioned algorithms, a positive 
selection approach is proposed. This method uses failed data to create specialized detectors to perceive a 
particular failure with 100% detection rate and remove detectors to reduce the false alarms to 0%. This 
method is used in [75] in a more extensive way changing the size of both clusters and detectors to 
perform similar tasks. In this case, the algorithm used can be outlined as: 
1. Chose a small subset of failed flights to be used for positive selection processes. Use 
these flights and obtain the detection results point to point, meaning that for each data 
32 
point one can obtain one of two situations: one detector is activated or no detectors are 
activated. 
2. Generate specialized detectors at each failed data point not detected. 
a. Generate the biggest detector allowable at the first incoming point that is not 
detected as faulty. 
b. Rerun the detection. 
c. Go back to point "a" until 100% of failed points are detected as such. 
d. Create a list of these points ordered from biggest to smallest. 
e. Generate the biggest detectors allowed following the order given by point d 
3. Eliminate detectors that induce false activations: 
a. Rerun the detection 
b. Remove the first detectors generating false activations 
c. Go back to point a until 0% of false activations is accomplished 
Items 2.d and 2.e proved to help reducing the number of detectors needed as in most cases some 
bigger detectors inserted first could enclose more failed points beforehand. The following flowchart 
presents this Positive Selection Enhancer (PSE) algorithm. 
 
Figure 8: PSE algorithm. 
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Even though this algorithm shows to be useful in increasing detection rates, care must be taken if 
the starting point is too ineffective in detecting the few known failures available for testing and/or training 
of the scheme. If the original detector set presents very low PPDR  for this set of known failures, and it is 
also found that the failed data points are not located inside the self, a first conclusion is that the coverage 
of the non-self is unsatisfactory. Moreover, if the PSE is successful in creating detectors to be added to 
the original set in order to make PPDR  reach 100%, it implies that the negative selection algorithm used 
left unexplored or not properly covered spaces. Even in this case, little can be concluded as to what the 
behavior of the scheme will be with completely unexpected failures; however, it can be presumed that 
other unknown upset situations, whose dynamic signature is found in places in the universe comparable to 
where the known ones are found, may also experience comparable values of PPDR . Detecting 
unexpected anomalies is the main strength of this technique and so acceptable values of PPDR  are 
desired for known failures before applying the PSE algorithm. 
2.2.3.4. Detection, identification, and metrics 
Each incoming data instance  is monitored versus the entire set of detectors using the definition 
of distance 
y
( ), hd y cλ . The following condition determines activation: 
 ( ),    for   1, ,h h DEd y c r h Nλ ≤ = T  (2.18) 
If (2.18) is true for any , the monitoring stops and the hth detector is said to be activated by this 
data point. To improve detection speed, the detectors are first ordered from the largest to the smallest. 
After each activation, the activated detector is moved to the first position of the detector set considering 
that the following data instance is likely to be located in the vicinity of the previous one. 
h
Outliers can trigger activation; therefore, single activation is not used for detection. To increase 
the robustness of the detection algorithm, a time window of  data points is defined as the time for 
which information of the activation of a detector is retained. During this time window, the number of 
activated detectors is added so that if all  previous data points activated a detector, there will be  
active detectors. This concept of simultaneous activation allows the use of a detection threshold 
WT
WT WT
threD  that 
determines what percentage of  is needed to be activated to declare a failure. The results show the 
effect of varying this threshold. 
WT
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The activation algorithm has four logical outcomes: 
• TP - True Positives: abnormal case detected as abnormal 
• TN - True Negatives: normal case NOT detected as abnormal  
• FP - False Positives: normal case detected as abnormal  
• FN - False Negatives: abnormal case NOT detected as abnormal 
The following 2D figure shows a simplified schematic for these four situations. 
 
Figure 9: Logical outcomes of FD scheme [54] 
For the identification phase, inevitably there is a need for a set of training flights including 
failures. These flights are used to create a list of the detectors that get activated for each particular failure. 
The identification only follows a positive detection and when the time comes, it is a matter of comparing 
the detectors that have been activated versus the detectors contained in the lists. If none of the activated 
detectors correspond to the lists of known failures, an unknown failure is said to have occurred. 
The Point to Point Detection Rate ( PPDR ) is defined then as the ratio between abnormal data 








⋅  (2.19) 
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The Point to Point False Alarm rate ( ) is defined as the ratio between normal data points 









⋅  (2.20) 
Where , , , and  stand for True Positive Points, False Negative Points, True 
Negative Points and False Positive Points respectively. 
PTP PFN PTN PFP
The Flight Detection Rate ( FDR ) is defined then as the ratio between abnormal flights detected 






= ⋅  (2.21) 
The Flight False Alarm rate ( ) is defined as the ratio between normal flights detected as 







= ⋅  (2.22) 
Where , , , and  stand for True Positive Flights, False Positive Flights, Upset 
Flights, and Available Flights respectively. 
FTP FFP FU FA
The Flight Identification Rate ( ) is defined for each particular failure as the ratio between 







= ⋅  (2.23) 
The Flight False Identification rate ( ) is defined for each particular failure as the ratio 








= ⋅  (2.24) 
36 
Where ITP  and IFP  stand for True Positive Identifications, False Positive Identifications 
respectively. 
Finally, the time to detect (TD ) is obtained as the time elapsed from the starting of the abnormal 
situation until the moment of the first data point for which the detection threshold is met. 
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Chapter 3: EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
This chapter presents the setup of the flights used in developing the Immunity Based scheme as 
well as those used for the comparison of FDI approaches. The data collection procedures are also 
outlined. 
3.1. WVU YF-22 Research Aircraft 
The aircraft test-bed used to carry out the flight tests involved in the design of the FDI scheme is 
shown in Figure 10. These aircraft geometrically resembles the USAF YF-22 and considering these 
similarities, it is named WVU YF-22; however, it is not a scaled version. 
 
Figure 10: WVU-YF22 used for flight testing – Main features 
The following table contains the main specifications of this aircraft and is a partial reproduction 
of a similar table presented in [76]: 






WVU YF-22 Specifications 
Wingspan 1.96 m 
Length 3.05 m (including nose probe) 
Height 0.61 m 
Wing Area 1.37 m2 
Take-off Weight 24 Kg 
Fuel Capability 3.5 L 
Maximum flight duration 12 minutes 
Cruise Airspeed 42 m/s 
Take-off Airspeed 30 m/s 
R/C Radio JR 10X 10 channel SRCM 
Table 1: Specifications of the WVU YF-22 aircraft. [76] 
The airplane’s propulsion system consists of a RAM 1000 miniature turbine engine, whose main 
features are presented in the following table. 
RAM 1000 Micro Turbine Engine Main Features 
Thrust 125 N 
Fuel Jet-A 
Control Electronic Control Unit (ECU) 
indirectly controls RPM adjusting 
fuel flow 
Max RMP 127,000 
Fuel consumption @ max RPM 0.35 L/minutes 
Fuel consumption @ cruise cond. 0.15 - 0.30 L/minutes 
Table 2: Main features of the miniature turbine engine. [76] 
The airframe is mainly manufactured with composite materials, foam, and wood. The Remote 
Control (R/C) system used is based on a JR Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) 10-channel radio package 
[76]. The pilot has control over the primary control surfaces (stabilators, ailerons, and rudders), secondary 
control surfaces (flaps), throttle, brakes, and a ‘control switch’ that allows engaging or disengaging of the 
autonomous controller. 
Electronic payload comprises approximately 5 Kg of the total weight of the plane. This airplane 
was originally designed to be part of a research effort involving formation flight (with two other matching 
aircrafts) and this payload was tailored for the specific needs of such experiments. The major components 
of this payload include the on-board computer (OBC), Data Acquisition card and related sensors, and on-
board power supply. 
The OBC is based on a PC-104 format computer system with the following main features: 
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OBC Main Features 
CPU module MSI-CM588 
Processor NS GX1 (300 MHz) 
RAM 128 Mb 




Table 3: Main features of the OBC. [76] 
The OBC contains also an IDE compact flash adapter and a set of custom developed controller 
board and sensor interface boards. The data acquisition system collects flight data both for the flight 
controller and for offline data analysis. The data comes from a suite of sensors including: 
Sensor Measured variables Range 
SpaceAge Mini Air Data Boom α ,  β ( )25, 25−  deg 
SenSym pressure sensors 
(connected to the SpaceAge 
Mini Air Data Boom) 
AP  ( )0,103.5  KPa 
DP  ( )0,6.9  KPa 
Crossbow IMU400 Inertia 
Measurement Unit (IMU) 
xA , yA ,  zA ( )10,10−  g 
p , , r  q ( 200, 200− )  deg/second  
Goodrich VG34 vertical gyro φ  ( )90,90−  deg 
θ  ( )60,60−  deg 
Potentiometers attached to 
control surfaces R
Rδ , LRδ , RSδ , LSδ , RAδ , LAδ  ( )15,15−  deg 
Thermistor T  ( )10,70−  deg C 
Novatel OEM4 GPS receiver 
GPSX , , GPSY GPSZ  N/A 
xV , ,  yV zV N/A 
Table 4: Sensors, variables measured, and ranges. 
A total of 22 analog channels are measured using 16-bit resolution at a rate of 50 Hz except for 
the GPS data which is acquired at a rate of 20 Hz. 
Six battery packs are used as power supply for all the electronic equipment on board: 
• Four 4.8 V, 1600mA NiMh packs for the R/C system (2 for receiver and 2 for servos). 
• A 7.2V, 1250mA NiCd pack for the ECU and the starter. 
• A 14.8V, 3300mAh Li-Poly battery pack to operate the OBC. 
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A study of Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) among the components was carried out as 
explained in [76] and the current positioning of the elements was selected in order to reduce EMI effects 
as well as extra considerations as signal cables shielding. Some extra EMI reduction was accomplished 
using ferrite RF chokes on the external wiring. 
The control system is designed to operate in three modes: 
• Manual (M): Pilot has full control over all R/C channels 
• Partial Autonomous (PA): The pilot has control over a subset of R/C channels while the 
on-board controller directs the remaining ones. 
• Full Autonomous (FuA): The on board controller has full control over all R/C channels. 
The pilot has the choice to switch (using the so called ‘control switch’) to Manual mode at any 
point during a flight, thus allowing this mode to be used as a safety mode to avoid dangerous situations 
following failures or extreme maneuvers performed by the OBES. Take off and landing of this aircraft is 
always performed using this mode. 
3.2. Data Collection Procedures 
The flight data used within this research effort was obtained as part of a comprehensive flight test 
program designed to obtain a new non-linear model for the WVU YF-22 aircraft [77]. They were not 
specifically designed for the development of the FDI scheme which produced additional constraints on 
the FDI scheme design process. These tests were performed at the WVU Jackson’s Mill facility located 
approximately 60 miles south of WVU campus in Morgantown WV. This facility features a paved 
runway allowing the operation of this type of aircrafts and it can be closed to public to make it a safe 
experimental setting for flight testing. 
All flights were performed within close visual range, on an attempted trajectory consisting of two 
semi-circles connected by two straight legs. All flights consist of the following stages: 
1. Manual take-off. 
2. 1 lap following the desired path used for trimming purposes and to gain altitude. 
3. A series of between 5 or 6 laps following the desired path trying to maintain constant 
altitude throughout the flight. 
4. Manual landing. 
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The tests consisted in performing standard maneuvers aimed to excite the different airplane 
dynamic modes. The maneuvers implemented in the tests are: 
• Stabilator doublet 
• Aileron doublet 
• Rudder doublet immediately followed by an aileron doublet (referred to as rudder-aileron 
combo or combo maneuver). 
In all cases, the maneuver is performed midway between the two ends of the path, in the middle 
of the straight legs at a maximum rate of two per lap. This indicates that ideally the plane is in level flight 
before the maneuver is injected. Approximately one second before introducing any of these maneuvers, a 
control signal engaged the PA mode thus positioning all surfaces in trim position, allowing only 
movements of the ones strictly involved in the maneuver (i.e. stabilators for stabilator doublet). After the 
maneuver is performed, all surfaces stayed at trim for a “waiting time” between 3 and 5 seconds to allow 
the plane to exhibit the different dynamic modes. After this waiting time, the PA mode is disengaged. 
Figure 3 shows a top view of the flight path and the place where the maneuvers/failures were injected. 
 
Figure 11: Idealized flight path with failure/maneuver injection areas. 
The two red triangles represent the airplane in two positions in the flight path and the apex of the 











Two types of failures are implemented: 
• Left stabilator locked at trim 
• Left aileron locked at trim 
The failures were implemented only on the left side of the airplane to favor security so that the 
injected maneuvers would produce rolling effects towards the pilot (inward of the path). This decision is 
not considered to produce any loss of generality. 
As was described earlier, one second before injecting the maneuvers, all surfaces are sent to trim 
position. The same applies in the case of failed flights, with the only difference being that instead of 
moving the surfaces involved in the maneuver on both sides of the plane, only one side is moved while 
the other one remains at trim position. 
Two general setups were used during this flight season considering who is in control of the 
airplane throughout the main part of the laps (item 3 on the description of the flight path): 
• Pilot-in-the-loop flights: The pilot controls the aircraft to follow the desired flight path 
throughout the laps only switching to the PA mode before manually injecting the 
maneuver. After the waiting time extinguishes, the pilot switches back to Manual mode 
to regain full control and continue the lap. 
• Autonomous flights: The plane is set on FuA mode so that the on board controller 
follows the desired path. The on board controller is programmed to switch to PA mode 
before injecting a prerecorded pilot-in-the-loop maneuver in the desired location during 
the lap. After the waiting time is extinguished, the on board controller switches back to 
FuA mode to regain full control and continue the lap. 
Autonomous flights were used to try to improve the repeatability of the tests. As can be inferred 
from the explanation above, in both cases the maneuvers injected consisted of pilot-in-the-loop 
movements. To avoid confusion, the chain of events following the engagement of the PA mode by the on-
board controller during autonomous flights is emphasized: 
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1. The controller is immediately switched off. 
2. All the surfaces are set to their respective trim condition. 
3. After about a second (enough time to ensure that the above point has been accomplished), 
a prerecorded maneuver is injected. 
4. No actions are performed during the waiting time of 3 to 5 seconds. 
5. The controller is turned back on and the mode changed back to FuA. 
The available data can then be separated considering who is in full control of the airplane at each 
moment in time and if there are failures present or not. The following table summarizes the partition of 
the data available: 
Type Condition Pilot Controller Short description 
1 Healthy Yes Off Pilot flying the plane using M mode or using PA mode and 
injecting maneuvers without failures. 
2 Failed Yes Off Pilot manually injecting a maneuver using the PA mode 
including a failure. 
3 Healthy No Off OBES injecting a prerecorded maneuver using the PA mode. 
4 Failed No Off OBES injecting a prerecorded maneuver using the PA mode 
including a failure. 
5 Healthy No On On-board controller trying to follow the desired path 
Table 5: Breakdown of available data from the 2008 flight season. 
Data types 1 and 3 are comparable because no controller is present, and are composed of either 
just a real pilot input (Type 1) or a prerecorded pilot input (Type 3). The same consideration is applicable 
for data types 2 and 4. The detector generation as is outlined later is performed using data types 1 and 3. 
The detection tests are performed using data type 2 and 4. 
3.2.1.  2008 flight tests 
The 2008 Flight season consisted essentially of about 15 successful flights designed to fulfill the 
needs of the development of the non linear model. The following is a partial reproduction of a similar 
table found in [77] showing a summary of the flights performed. 
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2008 Flight Season 
Flight Date Flight # Flight Description Data types available 
5/01/2008-
09/01/2008 
N/A Preliminary Test Flights (systems evaluation & 
software testing)
N/A 
9/16/2008 1 Pilot-Injected Elevator Doublet and Rudder-Aileron 
Combo Doublet; Pilot- Injected Elevator Doublets 
with Left Elevator Failure at Trim
1, 2 
2 Pilot-Injected Elevator Doublet and Aileron 
Doublet; Pilot-Injected Aileron Doublets with Left 
Aileron Failure at Trim
1, 2 
10/11/2008 1 Preliminary Virtual Leader Test Flight 1, 5 
2 OBES-Injected Elevator Doublets 1, 3, 5 
10/18/2008 1 OBES-Injected Rudder/Aileron Combination 
Doublets 
1, 3, 5 
2 OBES-Injected Elevator Doublets 1, 3, 5 
11/01/2008 1 OBES-Injected Elevator Doublets with Left 
Elevator Failure at Trim
1, 4, 5 
11/04/2008 1 OBES-Injected Rudder/Aileron Doublet 
Combinations with Left Aileron Failure at Trim
1, 4, 5 
2 OBES-Injected Aileron Doublet Combinations with 
Left Aileron Failure at Trim
1, 4, 5 
Table 6: Summary of 2008 Flight Season. [77] 
The first row takes account of all the preliminary flights that were used to tune up the on-board 
data acquisition, on-board controller, on-board excitation system, general flight testing procedures and 
data reduction techniques. All these tasks were necessary for the successful completion of the remaining 
flights; however, the data recorded during these sessions lack significance as compared to the rest 
considering that changes were introduced to the plane during these early stages. As it can be noticed, all 
flights provide data type 1 as at least the first lap and the final lap before setting up for landing were 
performed by the pilot using Manual mode. 
3.2.2. Flight data 
For this implementation, only data from the 9 flights described in the table presented in the 
previous section are used. The plane operates the large majority of the time at a relatively constant point 
of its flight envelope, meaning that throughout the laps both the altitude and velocity are almost constant. 
This implementation deals with a single point in the airplane flight envelope and thus, the useful 
data from each flight is extracted as data close to the desired conditions. GPS data for velocity and 
altitude are used to determine when this point in the flight envelope has been reached. 
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Once the useful data is extracted from every flight available, the next step consists of isolating 
each data type to allow its use separately. Data type 1 is the easiest to isolate as all useful data during a 
flight whenever the ‘control switch’ is OFF corresponds to this category in addition to the pilot-in-the-
loop nominal maneuvers where the ‘control switch’ is set to ON engaging the PA mode. Data type 2 
corresponds to the portions of data in pilot-in-the-loop flights that include maneuvers including failures 
where the pilot engaged the PA mode by switching the ‘control switch’ ON. The following figure shows a 
section of a pilot-in-the-loop flight including an aileron doublet with left aileron locked at trim. 





























Figure 12: Example of data types 1 and 2. 
It is important to clarify that even though the ailerons on both sides show identical measured 
values, the deflection was opposite for each side as required for rolling purposes. The plot shows the 
deflections of the two sides and the values of the ‘control switch’ signal which fluctuates from 0 to 4 (4 is 
scaling factor chosen to make the plot clear) depending if the PA mode is disengaged or engaged, 
respectively. All data when the control signal is 0 are data type 1 and for data isolation purposes, all data 
when the control signal is 4 are assumed as data type 2. Nonetheless, all the data contained in the region 
where the control signal is 4 do not fall strictly into data type 2. If all surfaces are set to trim and no pilot 
input is registered, the plane is essentially in a healthy condition yet whenever the maneuver is injected, 
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the plane is said to be failed. This more detailed consideration of the data is used only for detection tests 
to account for detection rates and false alarms as is explained in following chapters. 
Following with the data isolation, data types 3, 4, and 5 need to be separated in a similar fashion 
as was explained for data types 1 and 2. In this case, the ‘control switch’ signal cannot be used as a 
criterion as the control signal remained ON from the moment the pilot engaged the autonomous flight 
after the first lap, until he disengaged the autonomous flight when getting ready to land the plane. The 
following figure shows a section of an autonomous flight including a stabilator doublet with left stabilator 
locked at trim. 





























Figure 13: Example of data types 4 and 5. 
As is clearly seen, the control signal is always 4 throughout this section of the flight. Each flight 
and each maneuver was verified and analyzed to obtain the limits between data types 3, 4 and 5. In the 
particular example shown, data type 5 is assumed from the beginning until 356.8 seconds where the 
surfaces can be assumed to be at trim position (due to the recent engagement of the PA mode). From 
356.8 till 361.4 the surfaces are still at trim (or performing the maneuver) and, for data isolation, this 
section is assumed to be data type 4. Finally, everything after 361.4 seconds is considered data type 5 
again. It is important to note that after the end of the maneuver and the waiting time, the airplane 
experiences some extreme maneuvers as the controller regains full authority over the plane and tries to 
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take it back to the desired flight path. Data type 3 would correspond to a similar analysis but considering a 
healthy maneuver. 
As was previously detailed, the FDI design is based on pilot-in-the-loop data. Consequently, all 
data types 1 and 3 that were isolated in the previous steps are considered towards the creation of the self, 
while data types 2 and 4 as described above are used for evaluation of the FDI scheme. The following 
figure shows the three standard maneuvers used both in nominal and failed flights. The values are 
presented after a normalization process that is outlined in the previous chapter. 










































Figure 14: Examples of standard maneuvers 
The data in these maneuvers contain healthy data whenever no pilot input is being sent to the 
control surfaces. The following table summarizes the failures that are used in testing the FDI and includes 
for each of them the following information: 
• “Start” and “End”: The start and end time for the maneuver comprising the delay before 
performing the maneuver, the maneuver itself and the waiting time. 
• “F. Start” and “F. End”: The start and end for the maneuver itself that is the only portion 
where the failure is present as such 
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ID # Maneuver Start [s] End [s] F. Start [s] F. End [s] 
1 Stabilator 357.38 361.46 357.50 358.70 
2 Stabilator 387.46 391.80 387.82 389.02 
3 Stabilator 418.20 422.24 418.38 419.58 
4 Stabilator 448.58 452.50 448.70 449.88 
5 Stabilator 478.88 483.10 479.26 480.46 
6 Stabilator 509.26 513.50 509.58 510.78 
7 Stabilator 540.00 544.00 540.14 541.34 
8 R-A Combo 537.14 543.60 538.70 539.90 
9 R-A Combo 567.40 574.00 569.02 570.24 
10 R-A Combo 598.00 604.60 599.58 600.80 
11 R-A Combo 628.34 634.90 629.88 631.10 
12 R-A Combo 658.60 665.50 660.46 661.68 
13 Aileron + Bias 335.20 340.26 335.20 340.26 
14 Aileron + Bias 365.56 370.62 365.56 370.62 
15 Aileron + Bias 396.10 401.20 396.10 401.20 
16 Aileron + Bias 426.44 431.50 426.44 431.50 
17 Aileron + Bias 457.00 462.10 457.00 462.10 
18 Aileron 335.20 340.26 335.36 336.62 
19 Aileron 365.56 370.62 365.68 366.92 
20 Aileron 396.10 401.20 396.24 397.48 
21 Aileron 426.44 431.50 426.58 427.80 
22 Aileron 457.00 462.10 457.12 458.34 
Table 7: Failed maneuvers used for testing the FDI 
Maneuvers 13 to 17 correspond to flight #2 performed on November 4 of 2008, which due to an 
error on the configuration of the data acquisition system, recorded all the data with a considerable 
constant bias. Maneuvers 18 to 22 correspond to the previous maneuvers after removing this constant 
bias. The biased flights are used to test detection capabilities of the scheme for real sensor failure. Types 1 
and 5 portions of data of the flight mentioned above are used in the development of the FDI to avoid 
unreliable measures to be introduced in the creation of the Self. 
Approximately 600 seconds worth of data valid for healthy operation of the airplane including 
nominal standard maneuvers are used for the purposes of this paper. The data at upset flight conditions 
cover a total of 100 seconds. This considerable difference in the available data is produced because the 
failures were only active for a short period of time, while the plane was mostly flying in healthy 
conditions. 
It is important to mention that the same pilot performed the totality of the flights that are used for 
this implementation. Also significant to point out is that due to his own flying technique, the pilot rarely 
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uses rudder input to perform any regular maneuver unless the flight test scenario required such an input. 
This has consequences that are explained in Chapter 5. 
3.3. 6 DOF Flight Simulator and WVU IFCS F-15 Model 
The aircraft aerodynamic model implemented in this simulator was derived from the non-linear 
Fortran code based model of a high performance military aircraft distributed by NASA to academic 
institutions within the 1990 AIAA GNC Design Challenge [78]. WVU’s model is a version of the 
mentioned code with the same functionalities but implemented on a Matlab/Simulink environment. The 
aerodynamic and thrust characteristics are provided via a set of 42 look-up tables. WVU model also 
incorporates the aerodynamic model for canard surfaces to resemble the NASA F-15 research aircraft 
[79]. The aerodynamic look-up tables have been split to obtain the contributions of left and right surfaces. 
This Simulink simulation has been interfaced with a Motus 622i motion-based, 6 Degrees-Of-
Freedom (6DOF) simulator manufactured by Fidelity Flight Simulation, Inc. The interface created uses a 
computer (called Research Computer - RC) to run the Matlab/Simulink model and employs S-functions 
that incorporate User Datagram Protocol (UDP) code to open a communication port and send the 
necessary data to the Server Computer (SC) that is the main computer of the 6DOF simulator. The data 
are split and sent via two ports. One port communicates directly with the proprietary Fidelity software 
called Translator overwriting the motion base related variables to produce the corresponding movements 
(motion cues), while the other port communicates indirectly with X-plane to provide the visual cues. The 
visual cues, in fact, communicate with a plugin tailored for this particular application that overwrites the 
corresponding variables in X-plane [80]. 
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Figure 15: Schematic of Simulink-6DOF simulator interface. 
The pilot is provided with a dual flight command consisting of a 3 axis joystick for controlling 
the stabilators, ailerons, and rudders, and a separate module for the accelerator. Some special 
accommodation features were included the first time this interface was implemented in [80] to include an 
external joystick inside the cockpit. The following are some pictures of the simulator. 
a) b) 
Figure 16: a) Exterior view of simulator; b) View from the pilot seat showing joystick arrangements 
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3.3.1. Flight tests for comparison of FDI approaches 
This Simulink model includes a GUI designed to allow the selection of the different flight 
scenarios: including failures or not, using different NN inside the controller, piloted flights or recorder 
flight, etc. For the particular purpose of the tests designed, a separate set of blocks were implemented in 
Matlab to allow manual insertion of the failure. 
The objective of this section is to show preliminary results of comparison between two different 
approaches to FDI using the same simulated environment and obtain metrics that will assess the pros and 
cons of each. This is accomplished performing simple short meaningful tests and comparing the detection 
results of both schemes regarding: 
• Flights positive detections versus false alarms considering also the effects of: 
o Maneuvers performed before or after injection of failure 
o Particular piloting skills 
o Particularities of each method for results with determined failures 
• Time to detect 
• Computational load 
The designed flight situation consists of a set of maneuvers performed at constant altitude and 
mach number (single point of the flight envelope, h=20000 ft ; M = 0.75). The flight scenario consists of: 
1. 45º coordinated turn to the left with a bank angle of 20º. 
2. Stabilator doublet 
3. Aileron doublet 
4. Rudder doublet 
5. 45º coordinated turn to the left 
6. Includes waiting time before and after each maneuver consisting on level flight for 10 
seconds. 
Two intensities of failure are considered for actuators and sensors: 
• Actuator stuck in determined angle (stabilator, aileron, rudder):  
o 5º from trim position 
o 8º from trim position 
• Sensor failures (pitch rate, roll rate): 
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o Step bias of 5 deg/sec 
o Saturation of sensor via ramp of 8 seconds and saturation value of 10 deg/sec 
• Sensor failures (yaw): Reduced to avoid unsafe behavior of the 6 DOF simulator 
o Step bias of (5/3) deg/sec for yaw rate sensor 
o Saturation of sensor via ramp of 8 seconds and saturation value of (10/3) deg/sec 
for yaw rate sensor 
Different failure injection points are considered to understand the effect of the moment of a 
failure occurrence in the detection process. 
• 9 different points were selected corresponding to: 
o 5 points are considered for failure injection during each of the maneuvers 
o 4 points are considered for failure injection in between each of the 5 maneuvers. 
All this analysis concludes in the need for 113 flights to complete this research; however, as was 
stated earlier in this subsection, the analysis presented in this thesis does not intend to be comprehensive. 
Much on the contrary, the purpose of these sections is to show an interesting line of research for 
comparing FDI based on completely different schemes. A preliminary analysis is also performed to assess 
the benefits of having a detection scheme to aid the pilot cope with upset conditions. 
3.3.2. NN based FDI including the concept of floating limiter 
The FDII scheme as described in [80] is divided into three main steps: 
1. Detection: An unspecified abnormal condition is detected 
2. Isolation: The detected condition is classified as a sensor or actuator upset situation. 
3. Identification: The isolated upset situation is recognized to be: 
o Actuator isolation: stabilator, aileron, or rudder failure. 
o Sensor isolation: roll, pitch or yaw gyro failure. 
The FDII scheme is composed of two different sets of NNs with different characteristics. The 
Main Neural Networks (MNNs) monitor output sensors of the airplane model for a previous time window 
 to generate individual estimates of the three angular rates (one MNN for each channel) for time 
step . The Decentralized Neural Networks (DNNs) have an equivalent structure to the MNNs except 
that the sensors that are used for the estimation do not include the measured value of the particular gyro 




of all 6 surfaces, linear acceleration in the  axis and 3 axis gyro. Both NN sets are composed of a 
pretrained NN and an online learning NN using an ADALINE and an A+EMRAN Neural Networks [26].  
y
The outputs of these NNs sets are used to calculate a set of cross-correlation functions involving 
also the angular rates as measured directly from the sensors. Perhinschi et al. make clear that this FDII 
scheme [26] relies on the basic assumption “that the occurrence of failures on primary control surfaces 
can be monitored through the analysis of the aircraft angular rates alone”. The parameters used for this 
implementation are the following: 
• Mean Quadratic Estimation Error (MQEE): 
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• Roll-pitch rate Cross-correlation parameter: 
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• Angular rate dominance parameter: 
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The way this FDII scheme works consists in setting some boundaries for each of these signals 
that if exceeded changes the value of a flag. This flag activation system is embedded in a logic scheme 
that accounts for the three steps mentioned before. Initially, this FDI scheme made use of fixed threshold 
values [27] and thus the logic included waiting times for some parameters in order to allow evolution of 
slower signals. Perhinschi et al. presented in [26] an evolution of the FDI scheme in which the concept of 
Floating Limiter was used to create moving boundaries for the signals; however this work was only 
focused to actuators. In 2008, Sagoo et al. integrated the Floating Limiter to sensor failures as well and 
preliminary presented it in [81]. The work presented in [80] that constitutes a more complete analysis of 
this FDII method is used in this analysis as the starting point. 
3.3.2.1. Floating limiter concept 
The Floating Limiter (FL) concept is applied in [26] in contrast with the fixed threshold to avoid 
false alarms produced by pilot in the loop interactions with the model. An example of this is that similar 
values of the cross-correlation parameters can be accomplished by a failure or by pilot maneuvering. The 
FL bounds can be designed such that can allow large variations at lower rates (ideally associated with 
pilot inputs) and filter higher rates (associated with different failures). The FL concept as implemented in 
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This filter provides a mean average value X  of the signals using a time window  of 1 second 
[26]. The FL threshold is calculated as: 
δ
 ( ) ( )ThdX X Xβ σ= + ⋅ +b  (3.7) 
Where  is a bound factor, β ( )Xσ  is the standard deviation of the signal in the same considered 
time window , and b  is a bias. All these parameters as well as the filter itself admit changes in order to 
make the FL more or less sensitive. For the implementation in [80] only an upper bound is used ( ). 
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Figure 17: Scheme of floating limiter concept as floating threshold. [26] 
3.3.2.2. FDII logic 
The logic embedded in this detection scheme is presented in the following flowchart. The 
subscript SUL stands for Soft Upper Limit. 
 
Figure 18: NN-FL scheme FDII logic – General scheme 
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Figure 19: NN-FL scheme FDII logic – Actuator failures 
 
Figure 20: NN-FL scheme FDII logic – Sensor failure 
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3.3.2.3. FL based FDII scheme parameter tuning 
Sagoo in [80] performed the tuning of the FDII system for a simplified flight scenario that 
consisted basically of a short segment of level flight with pilot in the loop. The inclusion of maneuvers in 
the present tests requires an intensive retuning of the parameters involved in the FL threshold calculation. 
This tuning needs to be performed with a complete set of the available failures and maybe using the 
totality of the flights. This is highly impractical as no auto-regulating tool is yet developed to modify the 
FL parameters. 
The developed AIS based FDI scheme for the WVU YF-22 deals only with stabilator and aileron 
failures and thus, the FL parameters are modified to deal with these two particular failures. A reduced set 
of data is used to try to obtain 0% of False Alarms and 100% of Detection Rate and correct Identification. 
The tuning process is somewhat iterative. The logic order to perform the tuning is the following: 
• Adjust the thresholds for MQEE  and OQEE : These are the variables that declare that a 
failure is occurring thus triggering the rest of the logic presented. 
• Adjust the thresholds for pqR  and rrR  so that all the stabilator and aileron failures are 
successfully detected as actuator failures. 
• Adjust the threshold for pqω  to avoid misidentifications between aileron and stabilator 
failures. This step may require also readjustments of the thresholds for pqR  and rrR  and 
also the waiting times 1tΔ  and 2tΔ . 
This process may also include slight modifications of the logic embedded for detection if no 
combination of parameters is found to comply with the training data for the logic given. 
3.3.3. FDI using negative selection approach 
Perhinschi et al. presented in [68] the framework for creating a comprehensive FDI scheme for 
airplanes using the Artificial Immune System paradigm. The results presented in the mentioned paper 
were obtained for the same WVU IFCS F-15 simulation described for this comparison. That 
implementation made use of many of the variables used for the FL FDI scheme however the use given to 
the same data is absolutely different. 
Hyper-spheres defined using Euclidean distance are chosen to represent the self/non-self space 
thus used as matching rules. Exhaustive motion-based flight tests were designed and performed in order 
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to obtain the self database. Normalization and clustering were performed using the methods already 
described in this theses; however due to the amount of information included in the self database, the 
preprocessing included an extra step consisting in eliminating data points that were closer than a 
determined threshold. Detector generation was performed using the ENSA-RV algorithm 
For this comparison, a self obtained in [68] is used to design an FDI scheme of the same type as 
the one designed for the YF-22. The identifiers were chosen to be as similar as possible, using the same 
number of dimensions and the same codes to generate antibodies. In this case and to allow fairness with 
the FL FDI scheme, a group of flights is selected to train both schemes. The Identification phase as a 
whole is based on the same concept applied for the WVU YF-22s consisting of creating lists of 
specialized detectors for each particular known failure. 
3.3.3.1. Flight tests used to design the FDI scheme 
Flight tests were designed to cover a wide area of the flight envelope; however for the work 
presented in [72] only a subset of such flights was used. The flight tests applied for the creation of the 
FDI scheme consisted in: 
• Level flight at h=20000 ft and M = 0.75 
• Climb at constant Mach to reach h=31000 ft and M = 0.75 
• Accelerate at constant altitude to reach h=31000 ft and M = 0.90 
• Decelerate at constant altitude to reach h=31000 ft and M = 0.75 
• Descend at constant mach to reach h=20000 ft and M = 0.75 
The flights lasted between 10 and 20 minutes each. At every different point in the flight envelope, 
the pilot was required to perform a series of maneuvers consisting in mild to moderate doublets and 
transitions between steady state conditions. Flights were performed with nominal conditions and with 
single failed conditions. 
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3.3.4. Refurbishment/Improvement of Simulink interface for 
6DOF flight simulator 
The interface as described in [80] is still functional; however, very little documentation was 
generated and thus, to be able to modify it, efforts were conducted to obtain more flexibility. Figure 15 
presented a schematic of the interaction between the different elements involved in this interface. 
3.3.4.1. S-functions and UDP data transfer 
Two Level 2 S-functions are implemented to receive data from the simulink model, open a UDP 
port, generate a UDP packet of data and send it. As outlined previously, one S-Function communicates 
directly with the Translator software that then provides the motion cues, while the other S-Function 
communicates with the designed plugin to provide the visual cues. These S-functions are referred to as 
Motion Base S-Function (MBSF) and Visuals S-Function (VSF) respectively. The variables needed as 
inputs for the MBSF are outlined in the following table [81]: 
Message # Item Variable Unit Convention 
170 0 Motion override flag N/A Should be set to 1 
1 Total airspeed knots N/A 
2 Angle of attack deg + Up 
3 Pitch acceleration deg/sec2 + Up 
4 Yaw acceleration deg/sec2 + Right 
5 Roll acceleration deg/sec2 + Right 
6 Side acceleration g + Right 
7 Normal acceleration g + Up 
171 0 Axial acceleration g +Forward 
1 Pitch angle deg + Up 
2 Yaw angle deg + Right 
3 Roll angle deg + Right 
4 Not used N/A Should be set to -999.0 
5 Not used N/A Should be set to -999.0 
6 Not used N/A Should be set to -999.0 
7 Not used N/A Should be set to -999.0 
Figure 21: MBSF variables, units and sign conventions. [80] 
All the variables presented in the previous table are defined as IEEE float 32 type for this 
implementation. Inside the same UDP package, two message structures are sent identified by the numbers 
170 and 171 and containing the described variables. This message structures are provided by the 
manufacturer to be able to successfully communicate with the Translator® software that drives the 
motion base. The port used to transmit all these data is 49000. 
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In the case of the VSF, the variables used as input are described in the following table. In 
addition, the corresponding DataRef (is explained in the following section) that need to be overwritten by 
the plugin are listed. 
Variable Unit Convention DataRef 
Latitude deg + North N/A 
Longitude deg + East N/A 
Elevation m Above Sea Level N/A 
Quaternions N/A N/A sim/flightmodel/position/q 
GPS Velocity in x m/s + East sim/flightmodel/position/local_vx 
GPS Velocity in y m/s + South sim/flightmodel/position/local_vy 
GPS Velocity in z m/s + Up sim/flightmodel/position/local_vz 
Roll rate deg/sec N/A sim/flightmodel/position/P 
Pitch rate deg/sec N/A sim/flightmodel/position/Q 
Yaw rate deg/sec N/A sim/flightmodel/position/R 
Throttle N/A 0 – No throttle 
1 – Full throttle  
sim/flightmodel/engine/ENGN_override
Aileron deflection rad + Right Ail. Up sim/joystick/artstab_roll_ratio 
Stabilator deflection rad + Tail Up sim/joystick/artstab_pitch_ratio 
Rudder deflection rad + Tail Left sim/joystick/artstab_heading_ratio 
Figure 22: VSF variables, units and corresponding DataRefs 
Latitude, Longitude and Elevation data are used as inputs to the function XPLMWorldToLocal 
that overrides the values for the three axis position of the plane. The airplane, however, is located initially 
over Morgantown, more precisely in the point with coordinates 39.64N and 79.91W. This position is then 
updated for every time frame using the above mentioned X-Plane function. The port used for these data is 
49001. 
Both S-functions open individual client UDP ports and prepare a binary UDP packet per time step 
containing the described information. At each time step, one UDP packet of data is sent through each port 
via the Ethernet connection to a pre-specified IP address corresponding to the Server Computer. 
3.3.4.2. X-plane plugin 
The data received from the visuals S-Function is then captured by the designed plugin and the 
values are used to overwrite variables in the X-Plane environment. X-Plane stores variables in a type of 
tree structure called DataRefs [82]. These DataRefs are organized considering what is the use of the 
particular value for the simulation environment. An example would be a DataRef like 
“sim/flightmodel/position/local_vx” that refers to the variable local_vx used to specify the GPS velocity 
in the world x axis and thus is related to positioning the flight model inside the simulation environment. 
Other DataRefs are not as intuitive as this one; the description of all DataRefs can be found in [82]. 
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The general process to override a DataRef is as follows: 
1. Define a variable inside the plugin as an opaque handle (pointer) to data provided by an 
external source or another plugin. Example: XPLMDataRef gP; 
2. Look up the desired opaque handle XPLMDataRef defined previously. Example: gP = 
XPLMFindDataRef("sim/flightmodel/position/P"); 
3. Manipulate the incoming data to assign it to proper variables within the plugin. 
4. Write a new value to a DataRef. Example: XPLMSetDataf(gP,fP); 
After the override is complete, the plugin returns a 1 to the X-Plane Plugin Manager (XPLM) 
indicating it has successfully completed its execution for the present timeframe. 
The following is extracted from [82] on the general behavior of plugins: “The X-Plane plugin 
system is built based on DLLs. The central component of this system is the *X-Plane Plugin Manager 
*(or XPLM). The XPLM is a library of code that manages plugins. The plugin is also a DLL. X-Plane 
links to the XPLM and the plugin (as well as all other plugins) link to the XPLM. The XPLM then serves 
as the central hub in the plugin system.” 
The plugin opens a receiving UDP port using the specific number for the visuals and collects the 
incoming packet of UDP data. This packet is processed to transform it from binary to floating point 
format in order to allow the use of these values for overriding purposes. It is important to clarify that the 
plugin will receive one and only one packet of data. If for some reason the connection is lost for one time  
step, the plugin does not perform the overriding and thus X-Plane generates the visuals based on the 
previous time step. This situation is experienced as sudden shakes of the visuals (and usually also of the 
motion base) that alter the quality of the simulation data because it causes confusion to the pilot. This 
situation, however, is extremely rare. 
The main source for documentation as well as examples of plugin programming is [82]. Some 
simple enhacements proposed for this interface consist in: 
• Use Master Warning as visual mean to inform pilot of Failure Detection also triggering a 
sounding alarm (sim/cockpit/warnings/annunciators/master_warning). 
• Display an on screen message with identification results using a more elaborate text box 
than the one used in [80]. 
• Allow the pilot a button on the joystick to disengage Master Alarm and/or on screen 
messages. (sim/cockpit/warnings/annunciators/master_accept) 
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• Control RPM meters in the cockpit so that whenever an engine failure occurs, the true 
values are reflected on the instruments. 
• Show throttle movements on screen. 
• Control stall alarm based on airplane information from the Simulink model. 
(sim/flightmodel/failures/stallwarning) 
Most of these features include simple overriding of particular DataRefs in an equivalent way as 
explained above. Some others include some special delopment as is the case with the on-screen messages 
that require the design of the dialog box and probably modifying the control panel image. 
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Chapter 4: AIS FAULT DETECTION SCHEME FOR WVU YF-22 
The entire process needed to obtain the FDI scheme based on the NS algorithm is described in 
Chapter 2. The present chapter deals with the particular design decisions adopted as well as with results 
regarding the design process of the scheme. 
For this particular application, it was found that a set of identifiers that could work both with 
longitudinal and lateral failures should include the three angular rates (p, q, r) and information regarding 
pilot input on the three channels. These are necessary to differentiate pilot induced couplings from failed 
conditions for several categories of abnormal conditions [68]. Lacking a direct measure of pilot input, the 






δ ) are used to provide the 
needed information on pilot input. 
To illustrate the process, a 2-dimensional simplified example is used next. Figure 4 shows an 
example of a set of antibodies created using Euclidean distance for a 2D space with pitch rate and rudder 
deflection as identifiers. Note that these two identifiers have been selected arbitrarily and no special 
detection capabilities are implied. 

















Normalized 2D Space - Antibodies
 
Figure 23: 2-Dimensional solution space using  and  showing faulty data. q Rδ
As is described in Chapter 2, the values are normalized between 0 and 1. The black line 
represents flight data for one of the aileron failures followed by the rudder-aileron combo maneuver. The 
circles correspond to each of the antibodies created. The ones in red dashed line are the ones that get 
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activated for this particular failure while the blue ones are inactive detectors. The empty space not 
covered by the detectors around q = 0.5 and 
RR
δ = 0.5, is the area that belongs to the self (healthy 
conditions) thus covered by the clusters. Clusters are not plotted to favor clarity of the graph. 
For comparison, the following plot shows a nominal set of data with the same 2D self as above. 
No detectors are activated in this case and so all are plotted in blue. 
















Normalized 2D Space - Antibodies
 
Figure 24: 2-Dimensional solution space using  and  showing healthy data. q Rδ
The plots shown above correspond to selves (and for consistency, also detectors) generated using 
2-dimensional hyper-spheres and Euclidean definition of distance. As was stated before, changes in the 
definition of distance while keeping the shape constant have consequences on the real shape. The 














































λ =  9
 
Figure 25: Effect of changing distance definition in 2D spheres 
It can be noted from the figure that the sphere tends to a square as λ increases. This is true for any 
dimension n as was presented in Chapter 2. Moreover, for a given constant radius r and dimension n, the 
hyper-sphere defined by the distance definition  encloses completely all hyper-spheres defined using 
, given that . This statement is important for the following design steps and is formally proved 
in Appendix A. 
1λ
2λ 2λ λ< 1
4.1.  Creation of the SELF 
The first step in creating the FDI scheme consists in splitting the available self data into data used 
for creating the self (via clustering) and data used for validation purposes. Self data are obtained using 
data types 1 and 3 (see table 6) from the following flights (see table 7): 
• Flight #1 – 9/16/2008 
• Flight #1 – 10/11/2008 
• Flight #2 – 10/11/2008 
• Flight #1 – 10/18/2008 
• Flight #1 – 11/01/2008 
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• Flight #1 – 11/04/2008 
While for validation purposes, the following flights are selected: 
• Flight #2 – 9/16/2008 
• Flight #2 – 10/18/2008 
Self data constitutes approximately 30,000 data points while validation data constitute roughly 
5,000 data points. Probably more data should be used for both categories; however, these are all the useful 
healthy data available. 
The self data are used as input data to the clustering algorithm and different sizes of sets of 
clusters are obtained. The resulting sets are guaranteed to cover all the points used for their creation. To 
test the validity of this set of clusters, a positive detection approach is used using the validation data. In 
this case, the generated clusters are used as detectors, then PPDR  corresponds to points that fall inside a 
cluster (inside the SELF). 
# of clusters 1722 5799 9881 14921 
PPDR  [%] 91.65 68.62 59.72 52.21 
Average radius [-] 0.0281 0.0115 0.0063 0.0035 
Std. Dev. [-] 0.0132 0.0078 0.0054 0.0034 
Table 8: Selection of number of clusters 
There is no definite way to chose the number of clusters; however, fewer clusters imply that these 
are also bigger thus covering more empty-space where detectors could potentially be placed. The average 
radius and standard deviation are shown here to give an assessment of the size of the generated clusters. 
The set shown in the last column presents a mean of 0.0035 that implies that a good amount of the 14921 
clusters have radii close to the imposed minimum of 0.001. This is not necessarily a bad result but 
considering the absence of a huge self database, slightly bigger clusters serve as an aid to compensate in 
part for the lack of information. The set of 9881 clusters is assumed to present an acceptable level of 
empty-space coverage and thus is used from now on as the SELF. 
Once the self is obtained, an interesting test consists in using the same self clusters but changing 
the distance definition using λ-distance with λ > 2. As was explained before, hyperspheres defined using λ 
> 2 still enclose at least the points limited by the hypersphere defined using λ = 2. To show the effect of 
this dimension change, all the available flights are used. 
67 
ID # Maneuver λ-distance definition 
λ = 1 λ = 2 λ = 3 λ = 4 λ = 5 λ = 6 
PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR PPFA PPDR PPFA PPDR PPFA  PPDR  PPFA PPDR
0 Validation 0.00 11.69 0.00 59.72 0.00 65.44 0.00 68.21 0.00 69.72 0.00 70.48 
1 Stabilator 0.00 0.69 0.00 25.69 0.00 39.58 0.00 42.36 0.00 43.06 0.00 43.75 
2 Stabilator 0.00 1.27 0.00 29.30 0.00 42.04 0.00 45.86 0.00 49.04 0.00 50.96 
3 Stabilator 0.00 0.70 0.00 73.94 0.00 93.66 0.00 94.37 0.00 94.37 0.00 95.07 
4 Stabilator 0.00 0.73 0.00 28.47 0.00 44.53 0.00 47.45 0.00 49.64 0.00 50.36 
5 Stabilator 0.00 1.99 0.00 58.94 0.00 79.47 0.00 84.11 0.00 85.43 0.00 85.43 
6 Stabilator 0.00 1.32 0.00 34.21 1.64 44.08 1.64 51.97 1.64 56.58 1.64 58.55 
7 Stabilator 0.00 4.29 0.00 42.14 0.00 54.29 0.00 58.57 0.00 58.57 0.00 58.57 
8 R-A Combo 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.98 0.00 19.10 0.00 23.95 0.00 25.86 0.00 26.62 
9 R-A Combo 0.00 0.74 0.00 12.64 0.00 19.70 0.00 22.30 0.00 23.79 0.00 24.91 
10 R-A Combo 0.00 1.12 0.00 24.16 0.00 31.23 0.00 33.46 0.00 34.94 0.00 35.69 
11 R-A Combo 0.00 0.75 0.00 15.73 0.00 23.97 0.00 27.34 0.00 28.46 0.00 28.84 
12 R-A Combo 0.00 2.82 0.00 30.28 0.00 37.68 0.00 39.08 0.00 39.44 0.00 39.94 
13 Aileron + Bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 Aileron + Bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
15 Aileron + Bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
16 Aileron + Bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
17 Aileron + Bias 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
18 Aileron 0.00 7.37 0.00 72.11 0.00 80.53 0.00 83.16 0.00 85.26 0.00 85.79 
19 Aileron 0.00 2.62 0.00 65.97 0.00 76.96 0.00 81.68 0.00 85.86 0.00 86.91 
20 Aileron 0.00 1.04 0.00 38.34 0.00 54.92 0.00 58.03 0.00 59.07 0.00 60.62 
21 Aileron 0.00 8.85 0.00 72.40 0.00 80.21 0.00 81.25 0.00 82.29 0.00 83.33 
22 Aileron 0.00 6.19 0.00 57.73 1.61 70.62 1.61 75.26 1.61 76.29 1.61 78.35 
Table 9: Effect of changing distance definition in positive detection performance of clusters. 
For clarity,  and PPFA PPDR  in this positive detection approach are explained: 
• PPFA : Measure of failed data detected as healthy. 
• PPDR : Measure of healthy data detected as healthy. 
It can be noticed that there is a monotonic improvement as λ increases. The following plot 
presents the behavior of PPDR  for λ from 1 to 15. The legend corresponds to the flight ID # as is shown 



























Figure 26: Evolution of Positive PPDR  with definition of distance 
Also more important to see is the evolution of . The following plot presents the  for 

























Figure 27: Evolution of Positive  with definition of distance PPFA
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The flights that are not shown in these two plots experience a similar behavior for PPDR but do 
not experience increase in  at least until λ = 15. From these plots it can be concluded that changing 
the distance definition can enhance the performance of the self with little or no cost. Better 
PPFA
PPDR  
accomplished with this Positive Detection approach implies that less  are expected to occur 
whenever the detectors are created. 
PPFA
By observing the results shown in the last two figures and in the last table, a value of λ = 6 was 
selected to be used from this point on, as the self does not experience significant improvements after this 
value, and the  are extremely small (or zero). PPFA
4.2. Creation of Detector Set 
Different approaches are shown in this section to put into evidence the strengths and weaknesses 
of each approach. The best result is chosen for the creation of the FDI scheme. It is important to clarify 
that, from this point on, the results correspond to Negative Selection detection. 
4.2.1. ENSA-RV algorithm 
Phase 1 of the algorithm presented in [73] is used as the first approach to create a successful 
detector set. Five detector sets are created and evaluated using the totality of the flights. The results are 
presented using PPDR  and PPFA as evaluation metrics. 
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ID # Maneuver # Detectors 
500 800 900 1000 1500 
PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  
0 Validation 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.24 
1 Stabilator 6.56 0.00 9.84 2.08 27.87 3.47 1.64 2.08 60.66 8.33 
2 Stabilator 1.64 0.00 8.20 0.00 29.51 0.00 1.64 0.00 55.74 0.00 
3 Stabilator 6.56 0.00 16.39 0.00 29.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.82 0.70 
4 Stabilator 1.67 0.00 31.67 0.00 30.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 86.67 0.73 
5 Stabilator 3.28 0.00 31.15 0.00 18.03 0.00 1.64 0.00 47.54 0.00 
6 Stabilator 1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.48 0.00 3.28 0.00 47.54 0.00 
7 Stabilator 0.00 0.00 21.31 0.00 31.15 0.00 3.28 0.00 50.82 0.71 
8 R-A Combo 31.15 12.55 57.38 12.93 50.82 13.69 39.34 13.69 67.21 15.21 
9 R-A Combo 12.90 1.49 9.68 10.41 48.39 4.83 33.87 4.09 58.06 8.92 
10 R-A Combo 27.42 2.23 48.39 4.46 37.10 8.55 40.32 6.69 72.58 15.61 
11 R-A Combo 27.42 2.62 51.61 10.11 35.48 6.37 37.10 7.49 64.52 14.61 
12 R-A Combo 20.97 6.69 38.71 10.92 48.39 11.97 54.84 10.92 72.58 13.73 
13 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
14 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
15 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
16 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
17 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
18 Aileron 0.00 0.00 1.56 0.00 4.69 0.00 6.25 0.00 4.69 0.00 
19 Aileron 0.00 0.00 4.76 0.00 1.59 0.00 7.94 0.00 1.59 0.00 
20 Aileron 0.00 0.00 9.52 0.00 1.59 0.00 34.92 0.00 15.87 0.00 
21 Aileron 0.00 0.00 14.52 0.00 6.45 0.00 8.06 0.00 14.52 0.00 
22 Aileron 0.00 0.00 4.84 0.00 8.06 0.00 4.84 1.55 3.23 0.00 
Table 10: Different size of detector sets generated with ENSA-RV algorithm 
This first table contains a vast amount of information and details that are very important to 
explain before continuing: 
• Validation data shows very low PPDR  pointing in the desired direction of obtaining low 
FFA . 
• All flights show monotonic increasing PPDR  with increasing number of detectors except 
for the 1000 detectors case that presents a considerable drop for stabilator failures. This is 
attributed mainly to two factors: 
o The reduced randomization processes involved in this method. 
o As was stated before, this method favors generation of bigger detectors 
considering these as better fit detectors. 
The consequence is that the space where these failures are located allows only small 
detectors thus increasing the size of the search space for the random inclusion of new 
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detectors. The algorithm tries to maximize the coverage; however, the limited space 
where these failures are located is probably tiny in comparison to the size of the non-self. 
• Flights 8 to 12 correspond to the combo maneuver, and the high PPDR  is due to the lack 
of meaningful rudder information. As was stated in Chapter 3, the pilot flies almost 
without using rudder input. This lack of information allows detectors to be placed in 
locations that correspond actually to healthy behavior. 
• Taking Flight 10 as an example and detector sets with 800, 900 and 1000, the PPDR  
varies and is actually larger for the smallest set. This can be explained because the 
algorithm used tries to diminish overlapping of detectors, and even though it can be seen 
that in the three cases some detectors are placed in this space, the sizes and relative 
positions may have been modified to reduce overlapping involuntarily reducing PPDR . 
• Flights 13 to 17 correspond to the biased flight mentioned in Chapter 3. The data 
obtained in this flight is located considerably far from the self and thus the algorithm is 
extremely successful in detecting these failures with 100% PPDR . 
• The detector set containing 1500 detectors outperforms the others except for flights 18 to 
22 that have better PPDR  for the detector set of 1000 detectors. However, in a global 
view, the 1500 detectors set is determined to be the best set obtained with ENSA-RV 
algorithm. 
To consider that a detector set is promising, a PPDR  of at least 50% is expected. This means that 
the 1500 detector set is only expected to perform successfully in detecting failures contained in flights 1 
to 17; however, it is virtually impossible that a PPDR  of 4% can be considered successful. 
An idea to increase the performance of this algorithm consists in adding more randomization to 
the process. A bigger initial population of 2000 random detectors is used and then these detectors are run 
through the censoring, cloning, and moving algorithm. As these 2000 detectors have big overlapping 
areas, the threshold  needs to be set extremely high in order to let more detectors enter the cloning 
and moving sections of the algorithm. 4000 random centers are also tried at each new iteration but as the 
iterative process takes no more than a couple of iterations (the initial value is close to the final value and 
many detectors are cloned and/or moved), not many such detectors make it to the final set. 
threw
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The initial random detectors generated are forced to be of a maximum possible radius 0.3 which 
is not necessarily a tiny radius but serves to prove the effect of forcing such detectors. The following table 
presents results using these 2000 detectors for all the flights except for flights 13 to 17 that, as shown 
previously, are not difficult to detect. 
ID # Maneuver # Detectors 
2000 small 2000 small + 
ENSA-RV 
1500 ENSA-RV 1500 +2000 
small 
PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  
0 Validation 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.53 
1 Stabilator 32.79 3.47 59.02 3.47 60.66 8.33 75.41 11.11 
2 Stabilator 8.20 0.64 47.54 0.64 55.74 0.00 60.66 0.64 
3 Stabilator 42.62 0.00 57.38 0.00 50.82 0.70 82.25 0.70 
4 Stabilator 56.67 2.92 83.33 2.92 86.67 0.73 93.33 2.92 
5 Stabilator 36.07 0.00 47.54 0.00 47.54 0.00 77.05 0.00 
6 Stabilator 13.11 1.32 29.51 1.32 47.54 0.00 54.10 1.32 
7 Stabilator 32.79 0.00 52.46 0.00 50.82 0.71 72.13 0.71 
8 R-A Combo 40.98 17.49 45.90 17.49 67.21 15.21 78.69 23.95 
9 R-A Combo 48.39 10.41 50.00 11.15 58.06 8.92 69.35 16.36 
10 R-A Combo 48.39 11.90 62.90 11.90 72.58 15.61 88.71 20.45 
11 R-A Combo 46.77 17.23 58.06 17.23 64.52 14.61 82.26 22.85 
12 R-A Combo 59.68 17.96 67.74 17.61 72.58 13.73 88.71 21.13 
18 Aileron 3.13 0.00 3.13 0.00 4.69 0.00 4.69 0.00 
19 Aileron 4.76 0.00 4.76 0.00 1.59 0.00 6.35 0.00 
20 Aileron 23.81 0.00 26.98 0.00 15.87 0.00 34.92 0.00 
21 Aileron 17.74 1.04 17.74 1.04 14.52 0.00 17.74 1.04 
22 Aileron 3.23 0.00 3.23 0.00 3.23 0.00 4.84 0.00 
Table 11: Effect of adding more randomization to ENSA-RV 
The first column presents the results for the 2000 random detectors alone. These detectors are not 
bad even compared to the 1500 generated previously with the entire ENSA-RV algorithm. The second 
column presents the same 2000 detectors after letting the ENSA-RV algorithm perform cloning and 
moving on them. The final result of the algorithm is a set of 2138 detectors. The result obtained with this 
approach gets close to the results obtained with the 1500 detectors previously generated (showed in the 
third column). The last column is a set of detectors obtained concatenating the 2000 small randomly 
placed detectors with the 1500 ENSA-RV detectors. The result is a promising detector set that has still 
very low PPDR  for the last five flights presented. 
Giving a closer look to the previous table, an interesting fact can be extracted. The 2000 small 
random detectors produce a PPDR  of 17.74 and a  of 1.04 for the Aileron failure of Flight #21 and 
when these detectors are added to the 1500 ENSA-RV generated, the result is exactly the same. This 
means that the detectors included in the first detector set that are capable of detecting this particular 
failure have a large overlapping portion with the ones already in the 1500 ENSA-RV detectors. On the 
PPFA
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other hand, for a similar flight like 19 also presenting an Aileron failure, the result of the combination is 
almost equal to the addition of the individual PPDR . In this case, the particular detectors are placed with 
little or no overlapping. 
The next step consists on trying to improve the results of ENSA-RV using the Positive Selection 
Enhancer algorithm. 
4.2.2. ENSA-RV algorithm with Positive Selection Enhancer 
The PSE algorithm generates extra detectors using training failed data and also deletes the ones 
causing . One flight for each failure/maneuver is selected to use with this algorithm. The chosen 
flights are: 
PPFA
• Flight 1: Stabilator failure including stabilator maneuver 
• Flight 9: Aileron failure including combo maneuver 
• Flight 18: Aileron failure including aileron maneuver 
ID # Maneuver # Detectors 
800 ENSA-
RV 
800 ENSA-RV + PSE 
(F#1) = 811 
800 ENSA-RV + PSE 
(F#1, F#9) = 830 
800 ENSA-RV + PSE 
(F#1, F#9, F#18) = 845 
PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  
0 Validation 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.39 
1 Stabilator 9.84 2.08 100.00 0.00 100.00 1.39 100.00 1.39 
2 Stabilator 8.20 0.00 78.69 0.00 78.69 1.27 78.69 1.27 
3 Stabilator 16.39 0.00 91.80 0.00 91.80 0.00 91.80 0.00 
4 Stabilator 31.67 0.00 88.33 0.00 88.33 0.73 88.33 0.73 
5 Stabilator 31.15 0.00 86.89 0.00 86.89 0.00 86.89 0.00 
6 Stabilator 0.00 0.00 54.10 0.00 54.10 0.66 54.10 0.66 
7 Stabilator 21.31 0.00 86.89 0.00 86.89 0.00 86.89 0.00 
8 R-A Combo 57.38 12.93 57.38 12.93 68.85 12.17 68.85 12.17 
9 R-A Combo 9.68 10.41 9.68 6.32 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
10 R-A Combo 48.39 4.46 48.39 4.46 70.97 2.23 70.97 2.23 
11 R-A Combo 51.61 10.11 51.61 10.11 72.58 7.12 72.58 7.12 
12 R-A Combo 38.71 10.92 38.71 10.92 69.35 9.15 69.35 9.15 
18 Aileron 1.56 0.00 1.56 0.00 1.56 0.00 100.00 0.00 
19 Aileron 4.76 0.00 4.76 0.00 25.40 0.00 68.25 0.00 
20 Aileron 9.52 0.00 9.52 0.00 14.29 0.00 69.84 0.52 
21 Aileron 14.52 0.00 14.52 0.00 16.13 0.00 82.26 0.00 
22 Aileron 4.84 0.00 4.84 0.00 4.84 0.00 85.48 0.00 
Table 12: ENSA-RV detectors including PSE algorithm. 
The flights used for training are highlighted in green in the previous table to show how the effect 
of the PSE consists in generating and/or deleting detectors to finally obtain PPDR  = 100 and  = 0. 
As these flights are used for training the results are obviously perfect; however the other flights of the 
PPFA
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same type show notorious improvements after the training stage. In fact, for the last column that presents 
the result of using the PSE algorithm with the three flights chosen, all the failures have PPDR  higher than 
50% what is the desired minimum limit to consider a set of detectors as successful. 
Although the resulting detector set is acceptable to start the design of the detection phase, there is 
one issue that cannot be overlooked. The original detector set is not satisfactory in detecting this set of 
known failures, used for creating this FDI scheme. It is desired that the randomly generated detector set 
presents at least fair detection capabilities for known failures before applying the PSE thus assuming that 
probabilistically, unknown upset conditions located in comparable spaces in the universe will have higher 
chances of experiencing adequate coverage (this is explained in more detail in Chapter 2). 
Now knowing that a good detection set can be found, it is worthy to take a closer look at the 
detectors added by the PSE algorithm. The following values are calculated from the 65 specialized 
detectors added using PSE (20 detectors are removed during the same process). 
• Average radius: 0.0506 
• Standard deviation: 0.0385 
• Min radius: 0.0053 
• Max radius: 0.1817 
This values show that most of the detectors are added in areas where the maximum size for a 
detector is less than 0.2. Analyzing the size of the detectors generated for the sets already presented, the 
following table is obtained: 
Det. Set 500 ENSA-RV 800 ENSA-RV 900 ENSA-RV 1000 ENSA-RV 1500 ENSA-RV 2000 small rnd dets. 
det 0.20r ≤  264 (51.26%) 551 (68.88%) 613 (67.96%) 721 (71.46%) 1206 (80.29%) 1771 (88.56%) 
det 0.10r ≤  68 (13.20%) 185 (23.12%) 216 (23.95%) 286 (28.35%) 497 (33.09%) 1599 (79.96%) 
det 0.05r ≤  11 (2.14%) 24 (3.00%) 25 (2.77%) 49 (4.86%) 103 (6.86%) 175 (8.75%) 
Table 13: Analysis of size of detectors generated for some of the tested detectors sets. 
The presented values clearly illustrate the origin of the difficulty experienced by all previous sets 
of detectors to fill all the spaces where the failures are located. As is known from the outcome of the PSE 
algorithm, the majority of failure data is located in areas where the maximum allowable radius is below 
0.2, while the average is close to 0.05. 0.2 does not necessarily represent a small detector; however, it was 
noted earlier that the ENSA-RV algorithm favors detectors with even bigger radii. The need for a major 
search for smaller detectors is the main motivation for creating Algorithm #2. 
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4.2.3. Algorithm #2 
Six sizes intervals are defined for this case and the variables involved are presented in the 
following table. 
Size Interval Number of Dets. Clones 
Size 0 min 0.03r r≤ <  1
1350
3000RD RD
N N= ⋅  60CLONN =  
Size 1 0.03 0.05r≤ <  1
700
3000RD RD
N N= ⋅  25CLONN =  
Size 2 0.05 0.10r≤ <  2
500
3000RD RD
N N= ⋅  15CLONN =  
Size 3 0.10 0.20r≤ <  3
300
3000RD RD
N N= ⋅  0CLONN =  
Size 4 0.20 0.40r≤ <  4
100
3000RD RD
N N= ⋅  0CLONN =  
Size 5 0.40 1.00r≤ <  5
50
3000RD RD
N N= ⋅  0CLONN =  
Table 14: Sizes definition for NS Algorithm #2. 
The number of detectors is calculated based on how many detectors would be valuable to include 
of each size for a 3000 set of detectors (considering that this algorithm does not avoid overlap). A 
detector set is then generated using the above presented intervals and Algorithm #2. In the following 
table, the effect of different overlapping threshold  is shown. The value in parenthesis in the header 




ID # Maneuver wthre = 1 (1203) wthre = 5 (3139) wthre = 10 (4572) wthre = 20 (6410) wthre = 50 (9179) wthre = N/A 
(10007) 
PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  
0 Validation 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.78 
1 Stabilator 19.67 14.58 57.38 17.36 57.38 20.41 62.30 20.83 63.93 20.83 63.93 20.83 
2 Stabilator 24.59 4.46 54.10 5.73 55.74 5.73 55.74 5.73 55.74 5.73 55.74 5.73 
3 Stabilator 19.67 0.00 44.26 0.00 45.90 0.00 50.82 0.00 50.82 0.00 50.82 0.00 
4 Stabilator 35.00 2.19 83.33 5.84 83.33 5.84 83.33 6.57 83.33 6.57 85.00 6.57 
5 Stabilator 4.92 0.00 47.54 0.00 49.18 0.00 52.46 0.00 52.46 0.00 52.46 0.00 
6 Stabilator 0.00 1.32 49.18 1.32 49.18 1.32 52.46 1.32 52.46 1.32 52.46 1.32 
7 Stabilator 24.59 0.00 54.10 0.00 59.02 0.00 62.30 0.00 68.85 0.00 68.85 0.00 
8 R-A Combo 26.23 12.93 81.97 24.33 85.25 25.10 85.25 27.76 85.25 28.90 85.25 29.28 
9 R-A Combo 25.81 7.81 40.32 16.73 56.45 16.73 61.29 24.16 62.90 24.54 62.90 24.54 
10 R-A Combo 24.19 3.72 58.06 13.38 82.26 13.75 82.26 21.19 83.87 21.93 83.87 22.68 
11 R-A Combo 29.03 10.86 69.35 19.85 87.10 20.60 91.94 26.59 91.94 27.72 91.94 27.72 
12 R-A Combo 30.65 10.56 56.45 20.77 90.32 21.13 90.32 21.13 91.94 23.24 91.94 24.65 
13 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
14 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
15 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
16 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
17 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
18 Aileron 50.00 0.00 51.56 0.00 51.56 0.00 51.56 0.00 51.56 0.00 51.56 0.00 
19 Aileron 31.75 0.00 34.92 0.00 58.73 0.00 58.73 0.00 58.73 0.00 58.73 0.00 
20 Aileron 41.27 0.00 47.62 0.00 47.62 0.00 47.62 0.00 52.38 0.00 52.38 0.00 
21 Aileron 53.23 0.00 58.06 0.00 64.52 0.00 64.52 0.00 66.13 0.00 66.13 0.00 
22 Aileron 46.77 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 
Table 15: Variation of overlapping threshold for detector set created using Algorithm #2. 
The following figure summarizes the general trend of the flights shown in the table above. The 
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Figure 28: Effect of changing overlapping threshold for Algorithm #2. 
As is expected, increasing  has as a first consequence the increase of the size of the detector 
set as more detectors are accepted for maturation. The last column presents the results for the 10007 
detectors generated and as can be seen, all the failures have 
threw
PPDR  higher than 50%. An undesirable but 
expected consequence of imposing small detectors is that, together with the increase in PPDR , there is an 
increase in ; however, it is important to remember that most of the false alarms for flights 8 to 12 
are due to the lack of meaningful information for rudder inputs. 
PPFA
It is assumed that the more extensive the algorithm is run (more detectors are generated), the 
detector set would have probabilistically more chances of better filling more spaces. Using this Negative 
Selection approach for detection implies that for each time step,  distance calculations must be 
performed (one for each of the m  detectors). In healthy conditions no detector is activated and so all the 
calculations are necessary, while for failed conditions, the scheme runs until it finds at least one activated 
detector and then moves to the next time step. This means that the worst case scenario presents m  
distance calculations and  comparisons between the distance and the radius, for each time step. Two 
different Personal Computers (PCs) were used to estimate average time to perform these two operations. 
Considering a sampling rate of 50 Hz, these calculations should not last longer than 0.02 seconds and thus 
a maximum number of detectors for real time operation can be roughly estimated. 
m
m
 PC 1 PC 2 
Processor 2.5GHz Intel Core 2 Duo 3.4GHz Intel Pentium IV 
RAM memory 2 GB 2 GB 
Brand HP DELL 
Model Pavilion dv6000 Dimension 5150 
Type Laptop Desktop 
Average time to perform 
both operations 
68 10−⋅  seconds 
51 10−⋅  seconds 
Maximum detectors for 
real time operation 2600 2000 
Table 16: Estimation of maximum detectors set size for real time operation. 
It can be seen that computational efforts, when dealing with large numbers of detectors, are 
significant. A max limit of 5000 detectors is imposed to the scheme. This is almost double the maximum 
detector set for real time operation for the fastest computer described; however, as explained before, the 
calculations are greatly reduced in the presence of activation. As all the flights used (even the validation 
ones) present false activations, it is assumed that 2600 is too restrictive. 
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It must be clarified that the intention of this work is not real time operation; however, this would 
be an interesting follow up work and thus some consideration to maintain the scheme under certain limits 
of computational complexity are worth to be included. The results presented in Chapter 5 are obtained 
using PC1. 
A detector set of 25000 detectors is created with the intention of obtaining a final set of detectors 
that through overlapping censoring can provide a detectors set of about 5000 detectors presenting 
acceptable PPDR  values for the totality of the flights. The set created has the following properties: 
Property Value 
Initial random set size 25000 
threw  5 
Detector Set Size 5051 
Detectors with  [# 
(%)] 
det 0.20r ≤ 4686 (92.77%) 
Detectors with  [# det 0.10r ≤
(%)] 
4666 (92.38%) 
Detectors with  [# 
(%)] 
det 0.05r ≤ 4049 (80.16%) 
Detectors with  [# det 0.03r ≤
(%)] 
2022 (40.03%) 
Table 17: Summary of properties of chosen detector set. 




ID # Maneuver # Detectors 
25000 Algorithm #2 25000 Algorithm #2 
– Censoring wthre = 5 
PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  
0 Validation 0.00 2.04 0.00 1.35 
1 Stabilator 78.69 22.92 47.54 20.14 
2 Stabilator 86.89 8.28 57.38 8.28 
3 Stabilator 77.05 1.41 62.30 1.41 
4 Stabilator 98.33 12.41 86.67 8.76 
5 Stabilator 85.25 0.00 37.70 0.00 
6 Stabilator 62.30 2.63 52.46 2.63 
7 Stabilator 70.49 0.71 59.02 0.71 
8 R-A Combo 91.80 28.90 67.21 25.86 
9 R-A Combo 85.48 31.60 61.29 26.02 
10 R-A Combo 95.16 26.02 69.35 24.91 
11 R-A Combo 96.77 34.08 64.52 29.21 
12 R-A Combo 96.77 28.52 74.19 24.30 
13 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
14 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
15 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
16 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
17 Aileron + Bias 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
18 Aileron 84.38 2.63 82.81 0.00 
19 Aileron 60.32 0.00 55.56 0.00 
20 Aileron 85.71 0.52 68.25 0.52 
21 Aileron 82.62 2.08 59.68 2.08 
22 Aileron 80.65 0.00 77.42 0.00 
Table 18: Detection results for chosen detector set. 
The detector set before censoring possesses very good PPDR  values for all the flights with a 
lowest of 60.32%. The censored detector set still presents some very high PPDR  values and only two 
PPDR  under 50% (but close). This qualifies as a satisfactory detector set and thus is selected to create the 
FDI scheme. 
4.2.4. Algorithm #2 with Positive Selection Enhancer 
Even though the PPDR  achieved using just the result of Algorithm #2 are satisfactory, the PSE 
algorithm has proven to be able to increment them even more at a rather low cost. PSE Algorithm is 
applied to the chosen detector set in the same way it was applied in subsection 4.2.2 for an ENSA-RV 





Maneuver # Detectors 
5051 A. #2 5051 A. #2 + PSE (F#1) 
= 5051 
5051 A. #2 + PSE (F#1, 
F#8) = 5024 
5000 A. #2 + PSE (F#1, 
F#8, F#19) = 5044 
PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  PPDR  PPFA  
0 Validation 0.00 1.35 0.00 1.35 0.00 1.35 0.00 1.35 
1 Stabilator 47.54 20.14 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
2 Stabilator 57.38 8.28 72.13 8.28 72.13 7.64 72.13 7.64 
3 Stabilator 62.30 1.41 90.16 1.41 90.16 1.41 90.16 1.41 
4 Stabilator 86.67 8.76 95.00 8.76 95.00 8.76 95.00 8.76 
5 Stabilator 37.70 0.00 90.16 0.00 90.16 0.00 90.16 0.00 
6 Stabilator 52.46 2.63 65.57 2.63 65.57 2.63 65.57 2.63 
7 Stabilator 59.02 0.71 75.41 0.71 75.41 0.71 75.41 0.71 
8 R-A Combo 67.21 25.86 65.57 25.86 100.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 
9 R-A Combo 61.29 26.02 61.29 23.42 61.29 10.04 61.29 10.04 
10 R-A Combo 69.35 24.91 67.74 24. 16 79.03 4. 83 79.03 4. 83 
11 R-A Combo 64.52 29.21 64.52 26.22 80.65 7.49 80.65 7.49 
12 R-A Combo 74.19 24.30 72.58 23.59 87.10 5.28 87.10 5.28 
18 Aileron 82.81 0.00 82.81 0.00 82.81 0.00 90.63 0.00 
19 Aileron 55.56 0.00 55.56 0.00 55.56 0.00 100.00 0.00 
20 Aileron 68.25 0.52 68.25 0.52 68.25 0.52 68.25 0.52 
21 Aileron 59.68 2.08 59.68 2.08 59.68 2.08 70.97 2.08 
22 Aileron 77.42 0.00 77.42 0.00 77.42 0.00 80.65 0.00 
Table 19: Algorithm #2 detectors including PSE algorithm 
As before, the flights used to for the PSE algorithm are highlighted in green. The final detector 
set presents large values of PPDR  for all flights with a minimum of 61.29.  values are acceptable 
though as expected, the highest are experienced for flights 8 to 12. 
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4.2.5. Failure detection stage 
As was explained previously, single activation is not desirable to trigger Failure Detection and 
instead a time window and a minimum activation threshold are used. Both parameters allow tuning and 
determine the sensitivity of the FDI scheme. Increasing the size of the time window or decreasing the 
value of the threshold moves the scheme towards sensitivity and vice versa. The time window  is 
expressed in time steps for which the activation of a detector is kept in memory, while the detection 
threshold 
WT
threD  is expressed as a percentage of . WT
This section presents the results in terms of FDR
F
 (Flight Detection Rate) and  (Flight False 
Alarm). The following plots present the effects on 
FFA





















Effect of varying threshold and time window - DRF
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Effect of varying threshold and time window - FAF
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Figure 30: Effect of varying threshold on Flight False Alarms ( ) FFA
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Most failures only last for about 1.3 seconds (duration of the maneuver) and recalling that this 
represents 65 data points, an upper limit for  is set to 22 that is a third of the duration of the failure. 
 shows already undesirable results (increasing ) and so is the biggest value presented. 
WT
20WT = FFA
Another important aspect of the detection is the time to detect the failures. The following plot 














Effect of varying threshold - TD
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Figure 31: Effect of varying threshold on Time to Detect (TD ) 
The trends seen in the previous three plots can be summarized as: 
• Given a constant threD , there exists a range of WT  for which a maximum FDR  is 
reached. The opposite is true for FFA . This can be explained considering the fact that the 
detector set implemented contains nonzero PPFA  values for most flights. If the time 
window is made large enough, the activation is kept in memory for longer and then 
scattered false activations become added and are more likely to trigger false alarms. 
• Increases in both threD  and WT  have a general trend of increasing the average TD  
because more samples need to be considered to declare a failure. 
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There is an aspect not visible in the graphs and that is important to comment here. The validation 
data presents a very low PPDR  of 1.37%, unfortunately, this false activations are concentrated in two 
areas of the validation data. This is the cause of bigger values of FDR  corresponding to low  or large 
 combined with low 
WT
WT threD . 
There are four combinations of  and WT threD  that present 100 FDR
threD
; however, two out of these 
four ( ,  and , ) present  of 
5% and particularly present False Alarms for the validation data thus becoming inadequate. The 
remaining two, require , which is not seen as a desirable quality because it would require 
that absolutely all the points considered in the time window would need to be activated. Other 
combinations that present acceptable results both for 




 % 10 Time Steps
F
WT = 90 %= FFA
DR FFA and  are: 
1. , 90 %  , 94.74%  , 5.26%, 0.28TD s=  11 Time StepsWT = threD = FDR = FFA =
2. , 90 %  , 94.74%  , 5.26% , 0.33TD s=  12 Time StepsWT = threD = FDR = FFA =
Even though these two selections present positive value of , it is due to a premature 
activation in flight # 10 produced by the occurrence of some scattered false alarms immediately before the 
start of the failure. Any of these two combinations could be used; however, number 1 is favored due to 
having lower average TD .  
FFA
From the results shown in the plots and the analysis carried out, more test were performed in the 
vicinity of , . From these tests, the following values are selected: 11 Time StepsWT = 90 %threD =
•  14 Time StepsWT =
• 70   %threD =
These values provide exactly the same FDR  and  as options 1 and 2 before but with lower 
average . It is also seen as a benefit the use of a lower value of 
FFA
TD threD  considering that a less restrictive 
detection threshold may favor possible detections of unknown failures. 
The final result states that the activation is kept in memory for a time window of 0.28 seconds 
and a failure is declared if 10 detectors are found active at any given time. 
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4.2.6. Identification stage 
Abnormal conditions data is used to create a list of the detectors activated for each one of the two 
particular failures: 
• Left stabilator locked at trim 
• Left aileron locked at trim 
These lists serve the identification and thus are used to determine if a known or unknown failure 
has occurred. The identification stage only takes place after a positive detection. If the detector(s) 
activated is (are) contained in one of the two lists previously described, that particular failure is identified 
as such. If this is not true, an unknown abnormal condition is called. If an unknown failed condition is 
found, the system generates a record containing which detector/s activated for this particular situation to 
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Figure 32: Logic of detection and identification for the created scheme. 
The same flights used for the PSE algorithm are used to generate the lists in order to use the least 
amount of flights in training the system. The identification results are presented in detail in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5: ANALYSIS OF THE AIS FDI SCHEME PERFORMANCE 
 The flights that were not used for the training of the scheme are analyzed using the FDI scheme 
developed in the previous chapter. One plot for each particular failure/maneuver combination is presented 
together with general trends. The results are compiled in the form of a table at the end of this chapter. 
5.1. Stabilator FDI 
Stabilator failure is presented first to simplify the explanation of the plots used to characterize the 
results. The following is a figure exhibiting the outcome of the FDI process on Flight #4 consisting of a 
stabilator failure at trim followed by a stabilator doublet. The top subplot shows the normalized values of 
the different identifiers, while the bottom one shows the number of activated detectors at any given time. 
The red area is the part where the failure is present and thus where the scheme should get the most 
activation. The beginning and end of the failure are marked by darker red stems. Grey stems correspond 
to areas were all the surfaces are at trim and no failure is present. The black stem marks the detection 
time, while the blue stem marks the identification time. The dark horizontal line represents the detection 
threshold. 








































Figure 33: FDI – Stabilator failure – Flight #4. 
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As can be clearly seen, the results show a big increase in activation as soon as the failure becomes 
present and a gradual deactivation after the failure disappears. The effect of  is seen close to 451 
seconds as some small amounts of activated detectors; however, these are far from reaching the threshold. 
PPFA
Most stabilator failures in contrast with the one shown do not require an extra time for 
identification, as by the time the activations reach the threshold, some of the activated detectors already 
coincide with the specialized identification list. 
5.2. Validation Data 
Validation data are formed using parts of different flights. The following figure presents the result 
of FDI for this validation data considered as one continuous data stream. 









































Figure 34: FDI – Validation data – Flight # 0 
As stated before, even though the  for this case are rather low (1.37 %), most of the  
are concentrated around a few points. This constitutes one of the main reasons for raising the threshold. 
For the combination of parameters chosen, the threshold is not reached and as can be seen throughout the 
rest of the flight, the probabilities for exceeding this threshold are somewhat low. 
PPFA PPFA
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5.3. Aileron FDI 
This section presents results separately for cases having a combo maneuver or just an aileron 
doublet after the aileron failure at trim. 
5.3.1. Aileron FDI with aileron doublet 
This failure is equivalent to the stabilator one presented previously. The analysis is done based on 
an equivalent plot. 







































Figure 35: FDI – Aileron failure – Aileron doublet - Flight #18 
In this case, the detection and identification are coincident with no delay in between. This is 
caused because some of the 10 detectors activated before reaching the threshold belong to the specialized 





5.3.2. Aileron FDI with combo maneuver 
This maneuver is the most difficult to attain good detection rates due to the presence of the rudder 
input. The following figure shows one test case. 







































Figure 36: FDI – Aileron failure – Combo maneuver - Flight #12. 
Even though the detection is performed in a very short time, the presence of two activation peaks 
of 6 before and after the aileron maneuver, represent a risk if a lower threshold or a larger time window 
are used. A more complicated situation can be seen in the following figure for a similar flight. 
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Figure 37: FDI – Aileron failure – Combo maneuver - Flight #9. 
In this case, the problem is even more evident as a huge activation peak is found towards the end 
of the flight. This peak easily exceeds the threshold and thus triggers a false alarm. In the plot it can also 
be seen the big delay existing between detection and identification. This flight points to emphasize the 
need for more self data and/or better identifiers to avoid such undesirable qualities. 
5.4. Sensor Bias FDI 
It was described previously that flights 13 to 17 presented an unexpected bias in all the sensors. 
The idea of this section is to show the strength of the created FDI algorithm to detect a failure for which 
the system did not experience any training. 
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Figure 38: FDI – Sensor bias failure – Aileron maneuver - Flight #17 
All five flights available for this type of failure resemble exactly the behavior shown above. The 
sensor bias is easily detected as soon as the flight starts. The system does not perform any identification 
due to the lack of specialized lists for this particular failure. The detectors found in this flight can be used 
to identify other similar sensor failures. 
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5.5. FDI Results Summary 
The following table summarizes the performance of the FDI scheme in detecting abnormal 
conditions, declaring true failure detections and properly identifying the known failures. 







TD [s] Delay [s] TI  [s] Delay [s] Result 
0 Validation N/A 0.00 1.35 ND N/A NI N/A N/A
1 Stabilator 357.50 100.00 0.00 357.68 0.18 357.68 0.18 Stabilator
2 Stabilator 387.82 72.13 7.64 388.10 0.28 388.10 0.28 Stabilator
3 Stabilator 418.38 90.16 1.41 418.62 0.24 418.62 0.24 Stabilator
4 Stabilator 448.70 95.00 8.76 448.88 0.18 449.28 0.58 Stabilator
5 Stabilator 479.26 90.16 0.00 479.48 0.22 479.48 0.22 Stabilator
6 Stabilator 509.58 65.57 2.63 510.08 0.50 510.08 0.50 Stabilator
7 Stabilator 540.14 75.41 0.71 540.46 0.32 540.46 0.32 Stabilator
8 R-A Combo 538.70 100.00 0.00 538.88 0.18 538.88 0.18 Aileron
9 R-A Combo 569.02 61.29 10.04 569.22 0.20 570.08 1.06 Aileron
10 R-A Combo 599.58 79.03 4. 83 599.74 0.16 599.74 0.16 Aileron
11 R-A Combo 629.88 80.65 7.49 630.06 0.18 630.06 0.18 Aileron
12 R-A Combo 660.46 87.10 5.28 660.66 0.20 660.66 0.20 Aileron
13 Aileron + Bias 335.20 100.00 0.00 335.38 0.18 NI N/A Unknown
14 Aileron + Bias 365.56 100.00 0.00 365.74 0.18 NI N/A Unknown
15 Aileron + Bias 396.10 100.00 0.00 396.28 0.18 NI N/A Unknown
16 Aileron + Bias 426.44 100.00 0.00 426.62 0.18 NI N/A Unknown
17 Aileron + Bias 457.00 100.00 0.00 457.18 0.18 NI N/A Unknown
18 Aileron 335.36 90.63 0.00 335.56 0.20 335.56 0.20 Aileron
19 Aileron 365.68 100.00 0.00 365.86 0.18 365.86 0.18 Aileron
20 Aileron 396.24 68.25 0.52 396.48 0.24 396.48 0.24 Aileron
21 Aileron 426.58 70.97 2.08 426.80 0.22 426.80 0.22 Aileron
22 Aileron 457.12 80.65 0.00 457.36 0.24 457.36 0.24 Aileron
Table 20: FDI results for the complete set of failed flights. 
The results present an average TD  of 0.23 seconds and an average TI  of 0.34 seconds 
(excluding data used for training). The  is 100% and the  is 0%. Identification stage for this AIS 
scheme does not pose a difficulty. All tests run to verify the effects of varying the threshold showed that 
as long as the failure is detected, it will be always correctly identified as only one specialized detector is 
needed to declare that a failure has been identified. 
FIR FFI
Another interesting result is the actual time it takes for the scheme to provide the above presented 






= ⋅  (5.1) 
Where AT  is the actual time used by the algorithm and the real duration of the flight. The 
following table summarizes all these values. 
FT
ID # Maneuver Flight duration [s] Algorithm duration [s] %RT  [%] 
0 Validation 98.02 104.71 106.82 
1 Stabilator 4.08 3.14 77.04 
2 Stabilator 4.34 3.52 81.02 
3 Stabilator 4.04 3.08 76.26 
4 Stabilator 3.92 2.80 71.46 
5 Stabilator 4.22 3.26 77.33 
6 Stabilator 4.24 3.58 84.35 
7 Stabilator 4.00 3.24 80.95 
8 R-A Combo 6.46 5.53 85.56 
9 R-A Combo 6.60 5.80 87.88 
10 R-A Combo 6.60 5.73 86.77 
11 R-A Combo 6.56 5.62 85.69 
12 R-A Combo 6.90 5.88 85.17 
13 Aileron + Bias 5.06 3.14 61.99 
14 Aileron + Bias 5.06 3.17 62.63 
15 Aileron + Bias 5.10 3.24 63.46 
16 Aileron + Bias 5.06 3.14 62.11 
17 Aileron + Bias 5.10 3.25 63.64 
18 Aileron 5.06 4.13 81.69 
19 Aileron 5.06 4.29 84.78 
20 Aileron 5.10 4.38 85.81 
21 Aileron 5.06 4.38 86.51 
22 Aileron 5.10 4.39 86.11 
Table 21: Evaluation of potential real time application. 
The previous table shows that for most of the flights, the time spent by the detection and 
identification algorithm is less than the real time of the flight. However, as was expected, the biggest 
difference is obtained for nominal data as the activation is very low. Another important aspect that can be 
seen in the previous table is that flights 13 to 17 are the fastest ones to run as all the points in the flight 
activate detectors. On the other hand, these same flights after removing the bias (flights 18 to 22) take 
longer to run due to the reduced activation. 
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5.6. Comparison of AIS Results with Other FDI Methods 
The training of the two schemes is performed using the same limited set of flights. The training 
set consists of: 
• 2 Healthy flights 
• 2 Stabilator locked at 5 degrees failed flights 
• 2 Stabilator locked at 8 degrees failed flights 
• 2 Aileron locked at 5 degrees failed flights 
• 2 Aileron locked at 8 degrees failed flights 
The training set includes different injection points and also different pilots. The following is a list 
of the flights used with their particular information. 
Flight ID Failure Injection Point Injection time [s] 
A001 No failure N/A N/A 
S001 No failure N/A N/A 
A010 L. Stab. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 141.84 
A011 L. Stab. 5 deg. After Aileron doublet 165.10 
A015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 42.40 
A019 L. Ail. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 118.34 
S063 L. Stab. 8 deg. After Stabilator doublet 167.18 
S064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 147.26 
A073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 150.18 
S073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 232.88 
Table 22: Training flights for comparison of FDI schemes. 
In the same way, the following is the list of the flights used for testing the two FDI schemes. 
Flight ID Failure Injection Point Injection time [s] 
A002 No failure N/A N/A 
A003 No failure N/A N/A 
A005 No failure N/A N/A 
A006 L. Stab. 5 deg. Left turn 57.26 
A007 L. Stab. 5 deg. After left turn 148.70 
A018 L. Ail. 5 deg. After Stabilator doublet 159.44 
A021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Rudder doublet 155.06 
A064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 166.14 
S008 L. Stab. 5 deg. Stabilator Doublet 106.58 
S015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 94.32 
S021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Right turn 180.94 
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Table 23: Testing flights for comparison of FDI schemes. 
5.6.1. NN FDI scheme for WVU F-15 simulator 
Tuning for this scheme was done using the limited set of nominal and failed flights described 
above. After performing many trials following the process outlined previously, a successful set of 
parameters was found. In contrast with [80], in this case only the Soft Bound (SB) values are presented as 
this is the only threshold used in the applied logic. 
Variable
SBβ SBb  
MQEE  2.50 0.0000060
OQEE  3.00 0.0000015
pqR  0.05 0 
rrR  2.00 0.001 
pqω  0.60 0.0001 
Table 24: Floating limiter tuned parameters 
The results obtained using this modified scheme are presented in the following table. 
Flight ID Failure Injection Point Detect. [s] Isol. [s] Id. [s] Result 
A001 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
S001 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
A010 L. Stab. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 0.22 0.24 0.42 Actuator/Stabilator 
A011 L. Stab. 5 deg. After Aileron doublet 0.24 0.26 0.44 Actuator/Stabilator 
A015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 0.20 0.48 0.66 Actuator/Aileron 
A019 L. Ail. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 0.14 0.16 0.18 Actuator/Aileron 
S063 L. Stab. 8 deg. After Stabilator doublet 0.14 0.16 0.34 Actuator/Stabilator 
S064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 0.12 0.14 0.32 Actuator/Stabilator 
A073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 0.12 0.14 0.20 Actuator/Aileron 
S073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 0.14 0.16 0.34 Actuator/Aileron 
A002 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
A003 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
A005 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
A006 L. Stab. 5 deg. Left turn 0.22 0.24 0.26 Actuator/Aileron 
A007 L. Stab. 5 deg. After left turn 0.20 0.28 0.40 Actuator/Stabilator 
A018 L. Ail. 5 deg. After Stabilator doublet 0.16 0.42 0.44 Actuator/Aileron 
A021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Rudder doublet 0.48 0.88 0.90 Actuator/Aileron 
A064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Ail. Doublet 0.20 0.22 0.24 Actuator/Aileron 
S008 L. Stab. 5 deg. Stabilator Doublet 0.16 0.18 0.36 Actuator/Aileron 
S015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 0.16 0.18 0.20 Actuator/Aileron 
S021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Right turn 0.20 0.22 0.24 Actuator/Aileron 
Table 25: FDI results for training and testing flights using FL+NN scheme. 
The table presents first the training flights, which, as expected, are all detected and identified 
correctly. The test flights are included below the darker black line. For these flights, the detection is still 
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perfect ( ), however, the identification fails in 3 out of the 8 failed flights shown 
( ). The Detection, Isolation, and Identification times presented correspond to the delay 
since the failure is injected. The averages of these delays are: 
100%FDR =
37.5%FIF =
• Average Detection delay: 0.19 sec 
• Average Isolation delay: 0.27 sec 
• Average Identification delay: 0.37 sec 
The first drawback of this approach is the lack of an automated training system. As the 
parameters need to be manually tuned using a total of 10 flights, the process is quite time consuming and 
an optimal set of values is not necessarily found. The results show that the maneuver injection point may 
affect the identification logic producing confusion. A more comprehensive set of flights should be used 
for training thus allowing the scheme to learn the different failure signatures in different flight conditions. 
The main drawback of this FDI scheme is the lack of a flexible and automated training. In 
contrast, its benefits are its low computational cost that has already allowed an online implementation as 
shown in [80].  
5.6.2. AIS FDI scheme for WVU F-15 simulator 
The identifiers used for this implementation are the three measured angular rates ( , , ) and 
the reference angular rates (
p q r
refp , , ). This later variables are the output of a reference model 
contained inside the simulation. This model consists of a linear model of the F-15 and its inputs are 
directly pilot joystick movements. These reference values are assumed to be comparable with using 
directly pilot input or healthy surface deflections as in the WVU YF-22 implementation. 
refq refr
The self was obtained as described in Chapter 3 from the data generated for the implementation 
presented in [72]. The data is normalized and clustered using the presented algorithms and 4999 clusters 
are created using hyper-spheres and Euclidean distance. Tests to assess the benefit of changing the 
distance definition concluded that Euclidean distance presented the best performance. This performance 
was evaluated as shown for the case of the WVU YF-22 using Positive Detection. 
The ENSA-RV algorithm was used to create 500 detectors. Different sizes of detector sets were 
tried, but no significant improvement was experienced. The Positive Selection Enhancement is applied to 
this 500 detector set using the training flights in the following order: 
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1. A010: Stabilator failed at 5 degrees 
2. A011: Stabilator failed at 5 degrees 
3. A015: Aileron failed at 5 degrees 
4. A019: Aileron failed at 5 degrees 
5. S063: Stabilator failed at 8 degrees 
6. S064: Stabilator failed at 8 degrees 
7. A073: Aileron failed at 5 degrees 
8. S073: Aileron failed at 5 degrees 
9. A001: Nominal flight 
10. S001: Nominal flight 
The two nominal flights are left for the end as these will probably remove many detectors that can 
cause false activations. The time window and threshold used are the same as presented for the WVU YF-
22 implementation. 
It is important to note that as the flight consists of many different stages, it is possible that the 
variables may return to the self if the set of identifiers is not complete and/or the coverage is not adequate. 
The consequence is that not all the data that are considered failed will be in fact found outside the self, 
thus the detection rates are considerably lower than the ones presented for the case of the WVU YF-22. 
Flight ID Failure Injection Point DRPP [%] FAPP [%] Det. [s] Id. [s] Result 
A001 No failure N/A 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A N/A 
S001 No failure N/A 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A N/A 
A010 L. Stab. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 33.38 0.00 0.24 0.24 Actuator/Stabilator 
A011 L. Stab. 5 deg. After Aileron doublet 24.78 0.00 0.38 0.38 Actuator/Stabilator 
A015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 16.65 0.00 0.74 0.74 Actuator/Aileron 
A019 L. Ail. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 21.68 0.00 0.74 0.74 Actuator/Aileron 
S063 L. Stab. 8 deg. After Stabilator doublet 30.01 0.00 0.32 0.32 Actuator/Stabilator 
S064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 41.58 0.00 0.34 0.34 Actuator/Stabilator 
A073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 11.94 0.00 0.88 0.88 Actuator/Aileron 
S073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 24.47 0.00 0.26 0.26 Actuator/Aileron 
A002 No failure N/A 0.00 0.06 N/A N/A N/A 
A003 No failure N/A 0.00 0.04 N/A N/A N/A 
A005 No failure N/A 0.00 0.12 FALSE N/A Unknown Failure 
A006 L. Stab. 5 deg. Left turn 7.87 0.00 0.46 0.46 Actuator/Stabilator 
A007 L. Stab. 5 deg. After left turn 8.99 0.03 0.40 0.40 Actuator/Stabilator 
A018 L. Ail. 5 deg. After Stabilator doublet 1.99 0.30 11.82 11.82 Actuator/Aileron 
A021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Rudder doublet 2.88 0.43 12.52 12.52 Actuator/Aileron 
A064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Ail. Doublet 4.99 0.36 0.40 0.40 Actuator/Stabilator 
S008 L. Stab. 5 deg. Stabilator Doublet 10.56 0.00 0.46 0.46 Actuator/Stabilator 
S015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 1.65 0.00 75.78 75.78 Actuator/Aileron 
S021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Right turn 3.09 0.52 FALSE FALSE Actuator/Aileron 
Table 26: FDI results for training and testing flights using the NS approach. 
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As for the FL + NN scheme, the first 10 flights shown correspond to the training flights and as 
such have the maximum attainable PPDR  with zero . All the training flights are of course detected 
and identified correctly. For the testing flights (below the darker horizontal line), two flights out of the 
eleven present unsuccessful detection and/or identification results. Flight A005, a nominal flight, presents 
a false alarm (something not encountered for the FL + NN scheme); however, the scheme does not 
identify the false alarm thus categorizing the failure as Unknown. Flight S021 presents also a false alarm 
as the threshold is met before the failure hits. In this case, as the failure eventually is present, the 
identification is correct. 
PPFA
Due in part to the rather low PPDR  presented by the testing flight, the detection times are 
enlarged from those found for the training flights. Flights A007 and A018 present a delay of more than 10 
seconds to detect the failure while the worst case is flight S015 which presents a delay of more than one 
minute. The experienced delays can partially be attributed to lack of proper coverage of the non-self. 
Other cause can be the fact that this simulation contains an adaptive controller that reduces the effects of 
failures due to adaptation. This adaptation makes necessary that, to have a comprehensive set of 
identifiers, it would be required to include variables that contain information about the behavior of the 
controller. 
Training for this scheme is rather easy albeit time consuming. This is not a burden as the scheme 
is trained offline. As for the case of the FL + NN scheme, this one would also get benefits of using more 
training data, however, the main problems encountered in this implementation are related to the selected 
identifiers. The identifiers used for the WVU YF-22 FDI scheme, were selected out of the limited amount 
of variables available and it was shown previously that most of the difficulties in attaining good detection 
capabilities were produced by the lack of a comprehensive set of identifiers. In spite of that, the present 
identifiers were chosen to resemble as close as possible that used for the WVU YF-22 to allow an analysis 
of the effect of using not so strong identifiers in a more demanding flying scenario. The results suggest 
that it will be very difficult if no impossible to obtain a successful FDI scheme out of using just angular 
rates and reference angular rates. The NN derived parameters used for the FL + NN scheme have been 
shown to capture actuator failure signatures in [26], so it would be expected that a self using such 
parameters would present better overall results as those shown in [72].  
As a summary, the main drawbacks of this approach are the need for a better selection of 
identifiers and the time consumed for training it. On the other hand, its main benefits include that it 
possess the potential of detecting untrained failures, and the possibility of an easy and automated training. 
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5.6.3. Analysis of pilot situational awareness possible increase 
thanks to FDI scheme 
The following table presents the pilot detection results for the training and test sets. The detection 
is recorded by the pilot pressing a button in the joystick whenever he senses the presence of an abnormal 
condition. The results of identification are obtained at the end of each flight and registered manually. 









A001 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No Failures 
S001 No failure N/A N/A N/A FALSE N/A No Failures 
A010 L. Stab. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 0.24 0.24 1.42 N/A Actuator 
A011 L. Stab. 5 deg. After Aileron doublet 0.26 0.38 1.00 N/A Yaw sensor 
A015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 0.48 0.74 2.14 N/A Actuator/Aileron 
A019 L. Ail. 5 deg. Aileron doublet 0.16 0.74 N/A N/A No Failures 
S063 L. Stab. 8 deg. After Stabilator doublet 0.16 0.32 1.28 N/A Actuator/Stabilator/Right Stab. Up 
S064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 0.14 0.34 FALSE 1.32 Sensor 
A073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 0.14 0.88 1.34 N/A Actuator/Aileron 
S073 L. Ail. 8 deg. Aileron doublet 0.16 0.26 1.08 N/A Failure/No Id. 
A002 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No Failures 
A003 No failure N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No Failures 
A005 No failure N/A N/A FALSE FALSE N/A Failure/No Id. 
A006 L. Stab. 5 deg. Left turn 0.24 0.46 0.90 N/A Actuator/Aileron 
A007 L. Stab. 5 deg. After left turn 0.28 0.40 0.90 N/A Failure/No Id. 
A018 L. Ail. 5 deg. After Stabilator doublet 0.42 11.82 1.06 N/A Failure/No Id. 
A021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Rudder doublet 0.88 12.52 1.12 N/A Actuator/Aileron 
A064 L. Stab. 8 deg. Ail. Doublet 0.22 0.40 1.00 N/A Actuator/Stabilator 
S008 L. Stab. 5 deg. Stabilator Doublet 0.18 0.46 FALSE 1.98 Actuator/Stabilator/Locked left stab. 
S015 L. Ail. 5 deg. Left turn 0.18 75.78 1.50 N/A Actuator/Rudder or Stabilator 
S021 L. Ail. 5 deg. Right turn 0.22 FALSE FALSE 1.76 Actuator/Aileron 
Table 27: Detection delays for the two FDIs and for the pilot – Pilot identification. 
The first thing that can be noticed from the preceding table is that the human pilots present more 
False Alarms than any of the FDI schemes presented. Moreover, it can be seen that the average time it 
takes for the pilots to detect the failures is around 1.37 seconds. It should be noted that these times include 
perception, processing, and reaction times and thus care should be taken in directly comparing the 
detection delays. The two columns for Pilot detection delay are presented because for some flights, after a 
false detection, the pilots were able to correctly detect the true failure. 
These false alarms are attributed to the fact that, after several test sessions, the pilots start 
expecting the occurrence of failures and so become oversensitive in declaring. According to both pilots 
employed for this preliminary comparison, their false detections were mainly produced by their 
perception of extraneous movements of the motion base. 
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Regarding Identification skills, the pilots present some outstanding cases like flight S008 were the 
left side is correctly identified as failed. Nevertheless, the pilots present a couple of flights in which a 
failure is detected but they could not perform any identification like flights A007, A018 and A019. 
Finally, they also present confusion with completely different failures like flight A011 for which the pilot 
declared a Yaw Sensor failure. 
Considering that these are just partial results only for a limited set of failures, it is believed that 
the biggest aid that the pilots will experience when exposed to interaction with an FDI scheme will be the 
availability of more precise information on identification of the particular failures. Fast and correct 
identification is assumed to facilitate the pilot’s ability to perform correctly the flight scenario as 
introduced in [80]; however, comprehensive metrics for proving this concept need to be designed and 
tested with and without providing the pilot FDI information. 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSIONS 
Two Negative Selection algorithms were investigated and their performance evaluated. ENSA-
RV algorithm was evidenced to produce limited coverage in the close proximity of the self, while 
Algorithm #2 was successful in solving this problem. However, ENSA-RV used more thorough 
development techniques that gave the resulting detector set a smaller size compared to that of the 
Algorithm #2. 
A Positive Selection algorithm was proposed to enhance detector sets using training failed flights. 
This algorithm proved to be a very useful tool to obtain detectors in poorly explored areas of the non-self 
while also reducing false activations by removing detectors in poorly defined areas of the self.  
The effects of changing the sensitivity parameters were shown for the known failures and these 
results can be useful if a more comprehensive set of faulty flights is used. This process is believed to be 
greatly simplified if the available identifiers are capable of exhibiting the failure signature’s more clearly 
and preferably farther away from the self. 
All in all, the Negative Selection approach to failure detection proved to be a valid technique that 
can cope with a variety of faulty situations. It was shown how with a low amount of training data a 
successful FDI scheme can be obtained. This was accomplished with a reduced list of identifiers and a 
limited optimization process. The possibility offered by this scheme of identifying failures as “unknown” 
is seen as one of the greatest benefits of this technique as compared to other FDI techniques. 
The preliminary comparison between two different FDI schemes put the AIS based one in a 
slightly better position considering its ease of training. The FL + NN based FDI scheme presents a valid 
approach; however, in the absence of a better training method than trial and error, its application to a wide 
variety of failures is largely limited. The AIS based scheme has as another interesting and desirable 
benefit, the possibility of defining a failure as unknown which would be the case for a failure not used in 
the training process. This advantage is of great importance when considering a comprehensive FDI 
scheme. 
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Chapter 7: RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Some of the possible paths that can aid to improve the Failure Detection Scheme for the WVU 
YF-22 UAV based on the Negative Selection principle include, but are not limited to: 
1. A specific set of flight test should be designed and performed in order to obtain a broader 
set of nominal data that includes all three control surfaces excited in a variety of flight 
conditions to allow for the creation of a more complete and accurate self. 
2. Configure the On-board instrumentation to acquire more parameters that can serve as 
better identifiers. Some of these desired variables are outputs of reference models and 
direct measure of pilot inputs. 
3. Perform failed flights with a wider variety of failures including surface of different sides 
and also contemplate the presence of failures for longer periods of time during the flight. 
However it should be perfectly clear that security must always be the first concern when 
designing these flights. 
4. Test other detectors shapes such as hyper-rectangles or hyper-ellipsoids in combination 
with different definitions of distance to assess the suitability of each of these for the 
hyper-space defined by the selected identifiers. 
5. If needed, Algorithm #2 should be improved to reduce overlapping. 
Point 2 may allow for the creation of a SELF in which the failures can be found farther away 
from the self than for the ones implemented in this thesis. This may allow the use of the ENSA-RV 
algorithm without even needing PSE algorithm. If this is the case, phase 2 of the algorithm presented in 
[73] could also be used to optimize the detector set. 
If points 1 and 2 allow the creation of an FDI scheme that can perform in real time with the 
available computing capabilities of the onboard processor, the performance of the scheme could be tested 
in flight to assess its strengths and weaknesses when exposed to real conditions. If this online 
implementation is available, techniques for AIS online learning can be tested. 
Regarding the comparison of the AIS approach to other FDI schemes, the proposed scenario is 
assumed to provide enough information. However, a more thorough definition of how many flights and of 
which type will be use to train/tune the FDI schemes. For the case of the FL approach using NNs outputs, 
it is also important to create an automated way to train it because tuning it for two actuator failures took a 
considerable effort via trial and error. The complexity of the tuning increases as more failures are added 
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because more signatures need to be interpreted and successfully included within the detection and 
identification logic. 
For the case of the AIS approach, an extended set of identifiers should be used in order to include 
information of control system activity. This should not be a burden as the simulation used provides a vast 
amount of information. 
During the comparison, the results of the FDIs were contrasted with human pilot detection 
capabilities. The next step would be to obtain measures of pilot performance in the absence of an FDI 
scheme and using the FDI to generate visual messages on the cockpit that will inform the pilot of the 
particular failed element. Metrics for assessing pilot’s performance need to be developed. 
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APPENDIX A: EFFECT OF λ-DISTANCE DEFINITION IN HYPER-BODY 
The following figure shows how higher power definitions of distance cover at least the previous 
power definition. 























Figure 39: 2D circles of radius 2 using different definitions of distance.  
This does not necessarily mean that it is true for any dimension, or that it continues to be true 
even at higher values of λ . The following is a more formal mathematical proof. 
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Where  andi iQ x y= − i K  is the max of the absolute values of : iQ
 ( )1 2max , , , nK Q Q Q=  ⇒  0jK Q= ≥  (A.3) 
It is also important to assume that there is not only one max value, thus the max value jQ  is 













⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎛ ⎞ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜= ⋅ +⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑  (A.4) 
The  terms that contain the maximum values of h iQ  have been removed from the summation 
expression, thus, all remaining  are less than  what implies that: iQ jQ
 1iQ
K
<  (A.5) 
This means that all the terms in the summation converge to zero as λ goes to infinity, then: 
 ( ) ( )1lim , lim jd x y K h K Qλλλ λ→∞ →∞= ⋅ = =  (A.6) 
 ( ) ( 1 2, max , , , nd x y Q Q Q∞ = )  (A.7) 
This distance definition, as well as all n-distance definitions, comply with the four requirements 
for a distance to be valid: 
1. Non-negativity: ( ), 0d x yλ ≥  
2. Reflexivity: ( ), 0d x yλ =  iff C P=  
3. Symmetry: ( ) ( ), ,d x y d y xλ λ=  
4. Triangle inequality: ( ) ( ) ( ), ,d x y d y z d x zλ λ λ+ ≥ ,  
Now, let’s examine the previous definition for a constant . d∞ = r (A.7) is then always equal to 
the maximum absolute value of the components, which means jQ  and as only the boundary is being 
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considered, it means jQ d∞= = r
r
 thus the boundary is a hypercube of side . This hypercube 
coincides with the hypersphere defined by  in only  points (one for each dimension); the rest of 






So far it has only been shown that the hyper-body defined by a constant value of d r  
encloses the hyper-body defined by . The next step consists in checking the behavior in values in 
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⎛ ⎞⎟⎜= ⋅⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ 0=  (A.10) 
The last expression represents the condition necessary to have either a maximum or a minimum. 
This condition is true for the cases when any of the two summations is zero. The following expressions 
are obtained by evaluating these conditions: 
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QX Q i nλ−
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⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ = = ⇒ = ∀ =⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ n  (A.12) 
This result implies that the function is monotonic and as was shown before, for λ  that tends to 
infinity the hyper-shape encloses the Euclidean definition thus it can be stated that: A hyper-sphere 
defined using a distance  encloses at least all the points contained in hyper-spheres defined using a 
distance  as long as 
kλ
jλ j k≤ . 
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